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1. Introduction 
 
 
Women have made important advances in labour markets. The distinctions between 
the activities of single and married women are not as sharp as they used to be, and ambition to 
do well in a job is no longer restricted to men. Have we done enough to exploit the economic 
potential in our nations’ women and are our labour markets as good towards women as they 
are towards men? Are women satisfied with their opportunities and outcomes in the labour 
market? And are other demographic groups benefiting or hurt from the competition for jobs 
from more women? 
In this report we are addressing these questions from a variety of viewpoints. The 
focus is on the labour market: how many women have jobs, what jobs do they have, how 
much do they earn, and are labour markets giving them the chance to exploit their potential? 
We focus on Europe, but sometimes compare with the United States  and other OECD 
countries where employment rates of women are higher. We support the view that raising 
female employment rates is beneficial to the society as a whole. In a long-run perspective, 
when more of a country’s population is trained and put into productive use, competing for 
jobs and for markets worldwide, the better are the country’s chances that it will make more 
discoveries and grow faster with benefits for everyone. More directly, bringing more women 
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into the labour force increases gross national product through the introduction of new 
activities and through the recording of activities that were hitherto unrecorded and protected 
from taxation and regulation. It thus corrects a distortion in the tax system – that market 
activities are taxed but home activities are not – and in the process increases the tax base, 
which should make it easier for governments to manage their finances. 
Can Europe do better? European leaders certainly think we can do better. In the 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Union Council in Lisbon, which took place in March 
2000 and which set the agenda for employment in the Union for the next ten years, women 
featured prominently. Further elaborations took place in follow-up meetings in Barcelona and 
Stockholm again emphasising the role of women. The overall target for female employment is 
currently set at 57 per cent of the population of working age for the year 2005 and 60 per cent 
for the ear 2010. The targets for total employment are 67 and 70 per cent respectively. Not 
every country is required to achieve the average target but the evaluation of progress is 
usually done by comparing each country’s performance with the average. 
The European employment agenda is as much about overall numbers as about the 
quality of jobs. The emphasis on “better” jobs, a term that is still awaiting proper definition 
from the Commission, and on a “knowledge based” economy dominated by jobs in services. 
The focus on education with modern electronic means  and on the use of the internet as a 
means of improving economic organisation are welcome. It is still too early to make an 
evaluation of this objective. The focus on services is inevitable: all the job growth since the 
war and the employment gap between Europe and the United States are entirely in services. 
But low-skill and low-paid jobs also need to be done and one of our objectives in this report is 
to look at the whole range of jobs and ask whether our labour market institutions are helping 
job creation everywhere. It is certainly the case that much of the employment gap between 
Europe and the United States is in low-wage service jobs, such as jobs in retailing and 
personal services, although gaps also exists in more complex service jobs, such as 
professional financial services. 
We examine first the current situation with overall employment patterns and ask why 
there are such big differences in employment rates across Europe. We find that although 
European countries have had access to the same technologies that have helped American 
women leave the home and enter employment, not all European countries are taking 
advantage of these technologies. A lot of the employment rise in Europe over the last two 
decades is due to more favourable economic conditions. We identify some rigid institutional 
structures that inhibit job creation for women, such as rigidity in the establishment of small 
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enterprises, which are a dominant form of employment growth in service industries. When we 
ask what kind of jobs women hold we find that in some countries large fractions of them hold 
part-time jobs. However, we find that women in part-time jobs derive as much job satisfaction 
as those in full- time jobs, in contrast to temporary jobs, which are less sought after. 
Following the analysis of employment patterns, we turn to a close examination of 
wage earnings and the wage gap between men and women. As part of the overall employment 
targets of Lisbon, the European Union also requires equality of employment opportunity and 
wage earnings, and has set targets for the male/female gap in earnings. We find evidence that 
the wage gap is still present, although it has probably narrowed. A proper evaluation of 
relative wage gaps across Europe shows that there are no big differences across countries, and 
wage gaps are closely connected with overall levels of inequality and with the skill of the 
worker, low skill workers being the most vulnerable to discrimination. 
An examination of the competition for jobs in the labour market reveals that women 
probably compete more with young workers for jobs than with prime-age males. We suggest 
policy options to deal both with the objectives of the European Employment Strategy and 
with the competition for jobs between women and young workers. 
Section 2 sets out some facts about employment and sections 3-5 examine, 
respectively, overall employment patterns, types of jobs and earnings. Section 6 looks at the 
consequences of female entry for other groups in the labour market and Section 7 brings 
together our evaluation of the European employment targets and our policy suggestions for 
improvement. 
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2. Some facts about women’s employment patterns 
 
 
We begin with some facts about female employment rates in 15 European countries 
(Norway and the 15 European Union members except for Luxembourg), Canada and the 
United States. We divide the 15 European countries into fours groups: Mediterranean (Spain, 
Italy, Greece), Nordic (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark) Anglo-Saxon (United Kingdom) 
and  Rest of Europe (Austria, Be lgium, France, Germany Ireland, Netherlands and Portugal). 
We show that there are substantial differences between the four groups, but fewer differences 
within each group. This is especially true of the Nordic and Mediterranean countries, with the 
rest of Europe showing more differences. Our classification also reflects substantial 
differences in the organization of the welfare state, particularly so between the Nordic and 
Mediterranean countries.1 We claim later that the fact that the biggest differences in the 
welfare state and in female employment rates are both between the Nordic and Mediterranean 
countries is not coincidental, and attempt to narrow down the institutions of the welfare state 
that matter for the differences in employment rates. 
Table 2.1 records the progress made by women in the total employment rate since 
1960 and the distance that needs to be covered to meet the Lisbon objectives. Looking at 
performance in 2000, the gaps that are still substantial are in the Mediterranean countries, 
Belgium, France and Ireland. Figure 2.1 shows that the employment gap is due mainly to 
inactivity, not to unemployment differentials. The patterns shown in figure 2.1 allow us to 
talk about successes or failures in either participation or employment without the risk of 
inconsistency. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that there is a correlation between the female and male 
employment performance. Although some of the correlation shown in figure 2.2 is due to the 
business cycle, because both female and male employment rates are higher in a cyclical 
boom, most of it is due to the correlation between the employment rates of men over 55 and 
women. The European Union has a target for the overall employment rate of the over 55 year 
olds (“active ageing”), which is 50 per cent. It appears that the countries that are failing the 
EU targets in the female labour market are also failing them in the labour markets for older 
persons. 
                                                 
1 See for example Bertola et al. (2001) and references to the political literature mentioned there. 
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The gender employment gap, defined as the difference in the employment rate 
between men and women, is falling in all countries in our sample. On average, the gender gap 
nearly halved since 1980, from 30 per cent to 16.7 per cent by the year 2000. The fall in the 
gender gap was mainly due to the rising female employment rate, which took place in all 
countries in our sample, but also to a falling male employment rate, especially for the older 
groups. 
Women tend to work on average fewer hours each week than men, so focusing on the 
gender employment gap understates the difference in the supply of hours of work from each 
gender. We show next some facts about part-time employment, which demonstrates this 
point. Whether the European Union should also have an agenda for reducing the differential 
in hours of work, however, is a difficult question. Women may actually prefer to have part-
time jobs, given family circumstances and other sources of family income, in which case the 
focus of the European Employment Strategy on employment rather than hours of work is the 
correct one.2 We address this question in more depth in section 4. 
The experience of European countries with part-time jobs is varied. Table 2.2 gives 
the incidence of part-time employment for men and women (the fraction of jobs held which 
require on average less than 30 hours a week) and the share of women in full- time and part-
time employment. The incidence of part-time work among women is lowest in the Nordic 
countries, where the rate is comparable to the rate in North America. The female share of full-
time and part-time work in the Nordic countries is also close to the North American share. In 
the rest of Europe, however, there is generally more incidence of part-time work, with women 
accounting for a bigger share of the overall part-time employment. Whether we view the 
growth of part-time employment as a transitional phase, towards the integration of women 
into the full- time labour market, or as a regular occurrence that provides diversity for the 
women who want it is a moot point. We will address some of these issues later in this report. 
The Netherlands has the highest incidence of part-time work, with 57 per cent of 
employed women working part-time, and Norway and the United Kingdom come next, with 
40 per cent. Although these are also three countries with high overall employment rate for 
women, there does not appear to be a close association between the incidence of part-time 
work and the overall employment rate (figure 2.4). The correlation, however, fails because the 
                                                 
2 Of course, one can make the same preferences argument about overall employment. But it would be 
hard to claim that a gender employment gap in the Mediterranean countries of 30 points is due to women’s 
preferences, when the gaps in other European countries are so much less. 
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North American and Rest of Europe countries exhibit a variety of patterns. The low-
employment Mediterranean countries show also low incidence of part-time employment.  
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 looks at the role of education, focusing on men and women in the 
age group 25-54. The table shows the overall employment rate for men and women for two 
educational groups, those with secondary school or below, and those with university or 
equivalent degree qualification. It is striking but perhaps not surprising how employment rates 
vary with education. The better educated group experiences far higher employment rates than 
the less educated group in all countries in our sample. The gender employment gap is also far 
less for the more educated group. Even in the Mediterranean countries, women with 
university education are characterised by an employment rate close to 70 percent. The most 
striking example in this respect is Portugal, where employment among highly educated 
women reaches 90 percent. 
Because the gender employment gap is smaller in the population with post-secondary 
education, if the educational attainment of women were to increase the gender employment 
gap should fall. There are encouraging developments along this dimension. At ages 35-54 
women represent 52.1 percent of the population with a higher educational qualification, but in 
the 25-34 age group they represent 54.1 percent. This pattern is visible in all country groups, 
and is also visible, even more emphatically, for the case of tertiary education. 
The gender employment gap widens substantially when one takes into account the 
presence of children. Women are still the gender which is predominantly responsible for 
looking after children: the presence of children in a household increases the employment 
prospects of men and reduces those of women. On average, as Table 2.5 shows, the gender 
gap rises from 14.4 per cent for women without children, to more than 27 per cent for women 
with two or more children. This pattern holds both in the Nordic countries (with an increase 
from 3.3 per cent to 14 per cent in the gender gap) and in the Mediterranean countrie s (an 
increase from 27.8 to 48 per cent). The United Kingdom is another striking example. The 
gender gap increases from 5.4 per cent to 28.2 per cent when a women has two or more 
children. A similar patterns holds, perhaps surprisingly,  for the United States. The reason that 
these countries have high overall employment rates is that childless women work in large 
numbers, not because they managed to find ways to bring large numbers of women with 
children into the labour force. If attention is restricted to households with two or more 
children they resemble the low-employment continental European countries. Perhaps not 
surprisingly women with children are more likely to work part-time but men with children 
less likely to do so (see Table 2.6) 
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2.1. Women’s role in overall employment growth 
 
European countries have experienced a variety of employment dynamics since the 
early 1980s. Table 2.7 shows that some high-employment countries, led by Sweden, lost a 
substantial number of jobs in the last two decades, whereas others, led by the Netherlands and 
Ireland, made substantial gains. How are these changes related to the changes in female 
employment rates? We decompose average employment growth in each country by gender, 
age and part-time or full-time work, and assess how much each dimension contributed, in 
accounting terms, to average employment growth. 
Table 2.8 shows the decompositions of the average rate of employment growth 
between 1983 and 1997. Our results clearly reflect the narrowing of the gender gap. In all 
European Union countries, employment growth was much faster for females than males.  
Youths experienced below average employment growth, a fact that reflects largely changes in 
the schooling age and more generally the increase in education. The fall in the gender 
employment gap is accounted for by the growth of employment of women aged 25-49. In 
every country, the contribution to employment growth by prime-age women dominates that of 
prime-age men, even among Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Greece.  Job creation 
performance among those aged 50-64 was more mixed, reflecting in part the tendency 
towards early retirement in a number of countries. Nevertheless, the fall in employment 
among those aged 50-64 is much more marked for men than women.  
There are substantial differences within Europe, especially in the role played by part-
time jobs. The country that stands out in this respect is the Netherlands, the top European 
performer. The growth of employment among women aged 25 to 49 years, typically in part-
time jobs, accounts for about half the growth of overall employment. To a large extent the 
Dutch “employment miracle” is a part-time female employment miracle. The experience of 
Ireland, the other employment success story of the last twenty years, is more uniform across 
decompositions, with substantial employment growth observed for both men and women, and 
both full- time and part-time. In countries such as Belgium, Germany, France and Italy we 
observe growth in part-time jobs alongside a decline in full-time jobs.   
Figure 2.5 plots overall employment growth (averaged over 1983–1997) against the 
change in the share of part-time jobs, for the ten countries for which we have data, to test 
whether there is a positive association between employment growth and growth in the share 
of part-time jobs. As in the comparison of employment levels in figure 2.4, there is no clear 
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evidence in figure 2.5 that countries which experienced a rise in the share of  part-time jobs 
also experienced a rise in overall employment. The simple correlation coefficient for the ten 
observations in figure 2.5 is 0.4.3 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Garibaldi and Mauro (2002) confirm with econometric tests the claims made in the text. 
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3. What explains women’s employment patterns? 
 
 
There are two events that need explaining in the history of the overall female 
employment rate. First, what are the reasons for the big rise in the employment rate over time, 
and second, why does the rate differ so much across countries? Because employment rates 
across countries differ by much more than unemployment rates, the same questions can be 
asked about the participation rate, and in our discussion we refer to both, although we do not 
discuss unemployment (see figure 2.1). Both employment and participation are influenced by 
supply and demand factors. Employment may be low because not enough women want to 
enter the labour market, or participation may be low because not many jobs are being offered 
to attract the women into the labour market. In the first case low participation rates are 
explained by women’s preferences, in the second by employers preferences and 
discouragement on the part of the women. It is very difficult to disentangle these two effects, 
and it is made more difficult by the role of wages in the determination of the participation rate 
and the employment rate. In the world of the frictionless neoclassical economic model the 
participation rate drives the employment rate: according to this model the reason employment 
rates differ across countries is due to women’s preferences, given technology and wages. But 
once the influence of institutions is taken onto account the answer could be different and no 
general rules can be used to make any welfare statements about the participation and 
employment rates. 
The countries in our sample enjoy similar technological structures and standards of 
living, so it is more likely that the explanation for the differences in the employment and 
participation rates will be found in their institutional structures. We review first the 
explanations put forward in the literature for the rise in participation and employment and 
then use aggregate OECD data to identify macroeconomic and institutional influences on 
employment rates. 
 
 
3.1. The rise of female employment: A brief review of explanations  
 
Most research in the explanation for the big rise in the female participation rate has 
been done in the United States. Apart from the obvious advantage of the availability of good 
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data (and many resources devoted to pure research), the United States has the advantage of 
large participation rates which are a fairly recent phenomenon. Since there are relatively few 
institutional barriers to job creation in US labour markets, the reasons for the growth in 
female employment rates are usually found in the factors that shape women’s preferences for 
work over the home (“home production”) and in technological advances. 
At the beginning of the century, only 18 per cent of American women were part of the 
labour force. By the year 2001 this fraction had reached 61 per cent.  This trend has been 
particularly prominent for married women. The labour force participation rate of married 
women rose from 5 per cent in 1900 to about 60 per cent in 2001. There are a few plausible 
explanations for this change that have been investigated in the literature. One set of factors 
influences women’s participation through the supply of labour. The diffusion of new 
household technologies allows women to decrease the time spent in home production. The 
improvement in working conditions, both in terms of status and in terms of hours of work, 
makes it more attractive for women to go out to seek work. And the availability of 
contraceptive methods allows women to plan their fertility and the timing of births. A second 
set of factors has influenced the demand for women’s labour services. Key to this is the shift 
from manufacturing to services, which employ more women in jobs such as clerical and sales. 
Other favourable developments are the introduction of new technologies that made it possible 
for firms to create more “female-friendly” jobs, and the change in the wage structure.  Finally, 
the rise in the female employment rate is also explained in terms of the change in society’s 
attitudes towards the role that women should play in the household and in the workplace.   
In what follows, we review some of the explanations for the U.S. experience that have 
been proposed in the literature. We first discuss explanations for the trend growth in women’s 
participation since the beginning of the century. Then we review the post WWII period and, 
in particular, to the big increase in married women’s labour force participation that occurred 
in the U.S. between 1970 and the 1990s.  Some of the explanations proposed for this dramatic 
increase also apply to European countries, which have experienced a similar diffusion of 
market and domestic technologies.  
The influential work by Goldin (1990) provides an extensive analysis of the change in 
women's role in the labour market in the twentieth century. In particular, using cross-city 
estimates of income and wage elasticity, she studies how the relative importance of supply 
and demand factors in explaining women’s labour market experience has changed over time.  
She shows that the increase in women’s participation in the United States between 1890 and 
1930 may be mostly due to supply factors. That is, over this time period, women were mostly 
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employed in manufacturing and agriculture where the working conditions were meagre. As a 
consequence, a social stigma was attached to a working wife, it meant that the husband was in 
poor financial conditions.4 Between 1940 and 1960 this situation changed mostly because of 
changes in the type of available jobs. The availability of clerical jobs and the increase in the 
schooling level of working women made the stigma associated with a working wife much 
weaker.  The importance of demand factors was made even larger by improvements in the 
housework production process, and by the increase in the availability of market goods that 
could substitute for home-produced products. 
Over the final decades of the century both demand and supply factors have become 
important in causing the increase in women’s participation, as women’s labour force 
experiences became more similar to men’s. A quite large literature has stemmed from 
Goldin’s work. The documented increase in the availability of “good” jobs for women is 
interpreted by Galor and Weil (1996) as a form of “female”-biased technological change. In 
particular, they argue for a link between skill-biased technological change and changes in 
women’s fertility and labour choices.  
Smith and Ward (1985) explicitly measure the contribution of demand factors to the 
increase in female participation over the final decades of the century. They show that about 60 
per cent of the increase in North-American women’s labour force participation between 1950 
and 1980 may be attributed to the increase in real wages that took place over this time period. 
These calculations take into account the change in fertility that also occurred in response to 
the wage rise. Their breakdowns allow us to have an indicative measure of the contribution of 
other factors, such as the introduction of new contraceptive technologies, the increasing level 
of schooling, and changes in gender role attitudes, to the increase in women’s participation.  
Some of these explanations have been analysed in more recent papers. For instance, Goldin 
and Katz (2002) argue that the introduction and diffusion of the oral contraceptive (the pill) 
facilitated a woman's investment in human capital by almost eliminating the chance of an 
accidental pregnancy.  Indeed, they show how the number of women entering professional 
degrees, such as Medical School, Business School, and Law School, increased substantially 
between the early 1970s (when the pill first started to become easily available) and the late 
                                                 
4 According to a Gallup poll conducted in 1938, about 80 per cent of men and women disapproved of a 
married woman working if her husband was capable of supporting her. 
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1990s (when there were almost as many female first year students in Law and Medicine as 
male).5 
Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2002) focus instead on the liberating effect of 
new consumer durables (such as the washing machine, and the microwave) that reduced the 
amount of time required in the household, thus allowing women to allocate more time to the 
labour market. They find that about 10 per cent of the growth in female labour force 
participation between the beginning of the twentieth century and 1980 may be due to the 
introduction and diffusion of these domestic appliances. However, although the evidence they 
presented supports their hypotheses for the period 1940 to 1970, this seems not to be a 
convincing explanation for women’s behaviour over the 1980s and the 1990s, by which time 
such goods were widely available to every household in the country while women’s 
participation continued to grow substantially. 
Finally, some authors investigate the importance of society’s views about the role of 
women on their work decisions. Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2002) examine the hypothesis 
that an increase in the proportion of men with mothers who work makes working more 
attractive to their wives. In this case, the change in society’s attitude is conveyed by the 
change in attitudes towards working women brought about by some men experiencing a 
different family model – one in which their mothers worked.6 This mechanism has a 
persistent effect on the labour force participation of women in subsequent generations. 
Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) also study the importance of social norms in women’s 
employment decisions. They develop an augmented version of the standard neoclassical 
model where relative income concerns enter women’s utility functions and hence their labour 
choices. They argue that women’s employment decisions are significantly affected by the 
employment decisions of their reference group (including sisters and sisters in law).  
A number of contributions give a quantitative assessment of the importance of the 
observed changes in the U.S. wage structure and labour market returns in the explanation of 
the increase in the labour supply of married women between the 1970s and the 1990s. Starting 
with the work by Katz and Murphy (1992), several researchers have documented how returns 
                                                 
5 Other social trends of the early 1970s may also help to explain the rise in the number of women with 
professional degrees.  In particular, as argued in Costa (2000), the passage of Title IX in 1972, that applied civil 
rights legislation to universities, may have had an impact on the admission practices of graduate and professional 
schools.  
6 One criticisms of this assumption is that women may have been influenced by the past work 
experience of their own mothers. However, the empirical evidence shows that this is not the case. Moreover, this 
argument does not preclude the fact that as more women joined the labour force, attitudes towards these women 
changed in society at large.  Their argument does not preclude this additional transmission mechanism.  
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to education and experience, and within-group wage inequality, have been rising for both men 
and women over this time period.  This evidence seems to indicate that these changes in the 
wage structure can be taken, at least to some extent, as exogenous with respect to women’s 
prior work behaviour.7 Pencavel (1998) studies the change in women’s employment decisions 
between 1975 and 1994.  He finds that the increase in women’s wages account for between 
one quarter to a half of the increase in women’s labour supply (depending on the cohort) with 
the increased attractiveness of the marketplace relative to the household accounting for the 
rest. Moreover, he finds that husband’s wages have a very minor role in explaining a married 
woman’s work decisions. This is consistent with the work by Juhn and Murphy (1997) which 
shows how the slowdown of the husband’s earnings growth cannot explain the increase in 
married women’s labour force participation over the 1980s and the 1990s.8 
Olivetti (2001) develops a life-cycle model with human capital accumulation and 
home production and uses it to quantitatively assess the consequences of the increase in the 
relative returns to labour market experience on married women's life cycle labour supply. She 
finds that most of the increase in life time hours worked by married women between 1970 and 
1990 may be attributed to the increase in the relative returns to experience, whereas the 
decrease in the gender wage gap can only explain about 20 per cent of the increase in hours 
worked. The logic behind her argument is straightforward. In the 1970s, married women 
would temporarily cut back on market work during child rearing years. One cost of this 
withdrawal is the loss in accumulated labour market experience. Since this cost has become 
greater in the 1990s, we would expect married women to decrease the interruptions in market 
hours.9 
Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2002) study the effects of the decline of the gender 
wage gap and of technological improvements in the production of non-market goods on 
female labour supply over the past three decades.  They find that the decline in the gender 
wage gap can explain a larger increase in married women’s participation than the 
technological improvements in the production of non-market goods. This is not surprising, 
because as we argued above, the diffusion process of such goods was completed by the 1970s 
                                                 
7 Market wages influence women’s decisions to work, marry and have children, and vice versa. The 
studies we present in this section mainly focus on the first direction of causality 
8 Additional evidence that during the 1980s returns to labour market experience increased more for 
women than for men is provided by Blau and Kahn (1997) and O'Neill and Polachek (1993). These studies show 
that the increase in return to experience and the increase in actual experience for women explained a large 
portion of the decreasing gender wage gap. See section 5 on the gender wage gap. 
9 Caucutt et al (2002) also investigate the impact of the increased returns to experience on women’s 
fertility decisions. 
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whereas the largest decline in the gender wage gap occurred in the 1980s.  As also shown in 
Mulligan and Yona (2002), the decline in the wage gap is not enough to produce the observed 
increase in married women’s participation to the labour market.  They show, however, that a 
simple model of household specialisation can predict the observed increase in the labour force 
partic ipation of married women in response to an increase in wage inequality relative to the 
gender wage gap. 
The literature that studies the different unemployment experiences of Europe and the 
United States over the 1980s and the 1990s emphasizes the role of the interaction between 
labour market institutions in Europe and other macroeconomic shocks. As pointed out in 
Bertola et al (2002), the interaction between labour market institutions and macroeconomic 
forces in all likelihood also had a negative impact on the relative employment of some 
demographic groups (including women).   Moreover, it is also believed that the same 
macroeconomic forces (in the absence of “protective” labour market institutions) may have 
been responsible for the observed change in the U.S. wage structure.  This is the same change 
that made market work far more attractive than work at home for U.S. (married) women. If 
part of the increase in US women’s work hours is due to the increase in wages, the 
compression of the European wage structure may be one of the reasons why women do not 
work as much in some European countries. 
 
 
3.2. Explaining cross-country differences 
 
Cross-country differences in participation rates existed throughout our sample but also 
changed over time. Even if we compare country experiences since 1980, the female 
employment gap between, say, the United States and Germany in 1980 was about 5 
percentage points in favour of the United States but by 2000 it increased to 10 points. To take 
another example, in 1980 the gap between the United Kingdom and France was 5 points in 
favour of the UK, but by 2000 it increased to 12 points. There has been a uniform increase in 
female employment rates but some countries did better then others. In the first set of tests in 
this section we ask whether the reason that country experiences differed can be attributed to 
their institutional structure in labour or product markets. 
We first follow the methodology of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and try to identify 
differences in the responses of employment rates to an unspecified set of “unobservable” 
shocks. The idea behind these tests is that the reasons for the increase in female employment 
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rates cannot be quantified – as we argued in the first part of this section they have to do with 
the increased availability of consumer durables, developments in medicine and shifts in 
technology and social attitudes that cannot be easily quantified in a time series. Assuming that 
all countries in our sample had access to the same domestic and market technologies, which is 
a reasonable assumption given that our sample consists of the rich OECD countries since 
1970, we remove the common trends in participation rates with time dummies and the 
unexplained gaps between countries with country fixed effects and allow a set of institutional 
variables to influence the way that each country’s participation rate responded to the new 
technologies. The estimated regression is 
it
k
it
k
kttiit vxbddcE +++= å  
where Eit is the employment rate in country i at time t, ci  is the country fixed effect, dt is a 
time dummy for each period in our sample, xkit is a set of k  institutions that take different 
values in each country and some over time as well, and vit is an error term. The equation was 
estimated with non- linear least squares for 14 of the European countries in our sample (some 
of the institutional variables for Greece were missing), Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, 
Japan, Canada and the United States. 
The results are shown in Table 3.1. The institutions included are mostly labour market 
institutions, employment protection legislation, unionisation, unemployment insurance 
benefits and labour taxes. But we also include an index of product market regulation, the 
OECD measure of the administrative costs of setting up new companies. Employment 
protection legislation changes very little during the sample because of the absence of 
information on earlier years, and the company start-up costs do not vary at all. Only one 
observation per country is available, for the late 1990s. 
The results show that the only institution that is statistically significant is the index of 
product market regulation, although there is also weak support for the proposition that 
unionisation exerts a negative influence on employment. Product market regulation may be 
especially important for women’s employment because women are mostly employed in 
smaller establishments in the service sector – retailing, catering etc. – and if regulation 
impedes the entry and expansion of such establishments it restricts job creation. Product-
market regulation also appears to be a significant, and mostly neglected, institution in the 
determination of overall employment rates.10 Unionisation is a more commonly tested 
institution, with generally negative implications for overall employment rates. Our estimates 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Nicoletti et al (2001), Pissarides (2003), Lopez-Garcia (2003) 
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imply small effects on female employment rates. It does not contradict the work of Bertola et 
al (2002), who find that, if anything, countries with more widespread union membership 
experience less female employment relative to male. The natural interpretation of the Bertola 
at al (2002) finding is that although unions reduce male employment, they reduce female 
employment even by more. This is a surprising conclusion, in view of the fact that the 
unionised sectors of the economy tend to be the ones that have higher ratio of male to female 
employment, such as manufacturing or big state enterprises. 
We quantify the effect of unionisation and start-up costs on the employment rate by 
showing the predicted employment rate for the country that has the biggest and smallest union 
density, and the most stringent and least stringent start-up index. Our estimates say that if a 
country has all institutional variables at mean values, its employment rate between 1970/74 
and 1990/95 would have increased by 10.3 per cent because of the common unobserved 
shocks (the consumer durables, the pill, etc.). But if this country was the most unionised in the 
sample, employment would have increased by 4.7 per cent less, i.e., by 5.6 percentage points. 
The other estimates reported in the last column of Table 3.1 have similar interpretation. 
Caution should be exercised in interpreting the results with regard to unionisation 
because the estimate is imprecise, due to a large standard error. But product market regulation 
is estimated to have a large and precise impact on employment. The country with the most 
stringent regulations in the setting up of new companies (Italy) is predicted to have as much 
as 12.8 percentage points of employment less than the mean, and the country with the most 
liberal start-up requirements (Denmark) is predicted to have 6.8 percentage points more than 
the mean. 
The introduction of further controls in our regressions alters the results but does not 
alter the basic findings. In the regression reported in Table 3.1 all time effects were 
summarised in the time dummies. Replacing the time dummies by some time controls that 
have a country dimension – the Blanchard-Wolfers (2000) measure of strength of labour 
demand, the real interest rate, the gap of actual from potential GDP and the country’s terms of 
trade – gives the estimated equation 
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where yjt is a set of time series controls for each country. 11 
                                                 
11 Results did not change much when the time dummies were retained, in addition to the time controls. 
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The introduction of the country-specific time controls has no effect on the findings in 
Table 3.1 on the role of product market regulation and unionisation, but gives a bigger role to 
unemployment insurance (see Table 3.2). Both the level of the replacement ratio and the 
duration of entitlement exert a small negative influence on employment. For reasons that are 
not obvious, the real interest rate seems to be associated with more female employment, as is 
the rate of taxation. The former may be a spurious finding, female employment rates 
increased at the time that real interest rates also increased worldwide12, but the latter may 
indicate the role of part-time and temporary employment, namely, that taxation may make the 
typical male job more expensive than the typical female job and firms substitute female jobs 
for full- time male jobs. 
The other time controls have the predicted effect on employment. Interestingly, the 
terms of trade shock, which essentially reflects changes in the relative price of imported 
goods and depends partly on product market regulation, exerts a strong negative influence on 
employment, namely, when import prices rise relative to domestic prices employment falls. 
This may partly reflect the fact that import prices are an important component of inputs into 
domestic production. Employment protection legislation is still unimportant, in accordance 
with previous findings, but now unionisation and the benefit replacement ratio become 
statistically significant negative influences on female employment rates. Product-market 
regulation in the form of company start-up costs retains its negative influence on female 
employment rates. 
Table 3.2 shows that the country specific shocks can account for a sizeable fraction of 
the differences in the observed rise in female employment rates. The range is from virtually 
no effect in Denmark to just over 10 per cent in Italy and Norway. The institutional variables 
also explain differences among countries, with unionisation now explaining more of the 
observed divergence, but the index of product market regulation again accounting for the 
biggest range, at least when the lowest and highest index are contrasted. 
A question that has attracted attention in connection with female employment rates is 
whether state provision of family care units increases participation. At the Barcelona summit, 
for example, European leaders decided that by 2010 governments in the European Union 
should provide day care for as many as 90 per cent of children from the age of 3 to the school 
mandatory age, and for 33 per cent of children under the age of 3. We were not able to find 
data for family day care since 1970 but we found data since 1980 for the majority of our 
                                                 
12 However, the real interest rate remains significant when time dummies are introduced, although at a 
much lower level. 
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countries. The variable that we used in our regressions is total spending by the state on family 
day care divided by the number of women in employment. Family day care turned out to be 
statistically significant in both the regression without time controls other than the time 
dummies and in the regressions with the country-specific controls. An interesting finding in 
these regressions is that the level and duration of unemployment benefits become a stronger 
negative influence on employment. This suggests that if the welfare state compensates 
unemployed workers generously and provides generous day care services for women entering 
employment the disincentive effects are offset, but if it focuses only on unemployment 
compensation they are strong. 
The regressions with family day care are not reported, because the sample is much 
smaller and the estimates of the other coefficients are not altered in significant ways. We 
show, in figure 3.1, all the observations of the family day care variable against the female 
employment rate. Most of the countries in our sample spend very little on family day care and 
this is reflected in the concentration of points to the left of the graph. But the positive 
correlation between the big spenders and their employment rates, essentially the Scandinavian 
countries, is evident. The graph also shows a time series correlation. The sequences of points 
moving in the north-eastern direction evident in the graph are points that apply to single 
countries since 1980. Countries that have increased family day care spending and experienced 
a growth in female employment rates include the four Scandinavian countries but also 
Austria, Germany and Ireland. 
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4. Job segregation 
 
What types of jobs do women hold? Is there evidence of job segregation, namely, of 
discrimination leading women into non-standard forms of employment where their skills are 
nor utilized to their full potential? Occupational segregation has received some attention in 
the economics literature (see, e.g., Dolado et al. 2002) but less is known on systematic 
differences in the types of employment contracts held by women. The OECD (2002, chapter 
2) reported some evidence of gender discrimination in the type of jobs held by women, and in 
this section we probe deeper into this issue by making use of the European Community 
Household Panel. 
The recent empirical literature has often emphasized the spectacular growth of 
“irregular” jobs during the past few decades both in Europe and in the United States, typically 
including part-time, temporary and casual jobs (see OECD 1999, chapter 1, and the June 2002 
issue of the Economic Journal on Temporary Work for an overview). A key factor to 
understand recent labour market developments lies therefore in the study of the incidence and 
the characteristics of non-standard forms of work. At best, part-time work may provide an 
opportunity for flexible hours of work, and for combining wage work with family 
commitments, especially for women. However, part-time work may sometimes be a form of 
underemployment, paying lower wages and providing inferior fringe benefits than full-time 
work (see OECD 1999, chapter 1). Similarly, temporary contracts may provide firms with a 
useful means of worker screening, and therefore represent stepping-stones towards permanent 
employment. But they may also be used as a cheaper option of adjusting employment, with 
lower wages and severance payments, and poor human capital accumulation (see Booth et al 
2002a). 
The existing studies in the United States have identified a small wage penalty 
associated with part-time work (Blank 1990). But evidence on labour market transitions 
suggests that both part-time and temporary work are often part of the transition out of 
unemployment, leading to regular employment in the future (Blank 1989, Farber 1999). For 
the United Kingdom Harkness (1996) shows that, despite the narrowing gender wage gap in 
full-time jobs, women in part-time jobs have made less progress in attaining earnings parity 
with men, and lag behind full-timers in both skills and earnings. Fixed-term contracts also 
seem to pay lower wages and provide less training than permanent contracts in the U.K. (see 
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Booth et al. 2002b), but they do represent a stepping-stone to permanent work. For the rest of 
Europe, the available evidence mainly concerns temporary rather than part-time jobs, due to 
the recent boom in temporary employment in southern Europe, and most markedly in Spain,  
which is the focus of the bulk of European studies. These studies document a very strong 
persistence of temporary employment (Alba 1998 and Güell and Petrongolo 2003), with very 
low prospects of transition to permanent employment. 
In this section we examine whether the apparent segregation of women in Europe into 
non-standard jobs stands up to rigorous econometric testing and if so, whether this is because 
of gender discrimination or other reasons. After briefly discussing some conceptual issues and 
the data that we use we examine the incidence of non-standard forms of employment, gender 
preferences for them and the wages that each pays. 
 
 
4.1. Discrimination through job segregation 
 
Labour market discrimination is commonly understood as the residual difference in 
labour market outcomes that cannot be explained by factors such as preferences or human 
capital endowments of different categories of workers (Altonji and Blank, 1999). Studies on 
gender discrimination have typically addressed the question of wage discrimination, namely, 
what fraction of the gender wage differential cannot be explained by differences in skills or in 
their labour market price. Discrimination through job segregation is another form of 
discrimination, which may also lead to wage gaps, if the jobs to which women are segregated 
are lower-paying ones. Of course, job segregation can arise for other reasons. Men and 
women may segregate into jobs because of differences in preferences or because of 
differences in human capital and in each gender’s productivity in non-market activities.  
A major issue is the source of differences in human capital and job preferences across 
genders. Investment in women’s human capital may be discouraged by the expectation of 
future labour market discrimination and by pre-labour market discrimination in the quality 
and quantity of schooling (see Thomas 1990). Also, women’s preferences for certain types of 
jobs – typically part-time jobs – may be driven by social norms (see Akerlof 2000) or the 
impossibility to delegate home production. While it would be difficult to quantify these 
effects, the potential endogeneity of human capital investments and preferences with respect 
to gender discrimination would imply that the portion of job segregation that cannot be 
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explained by differences in human capital or preferences provides a lower bound for the 
extent of gender discrimination in the labour market. 
Throughout our analysis the types of jobs that we will consider are full-time versus 
part-time jobs, and permanent versus temporary jobs. While part-time jobs can be thought of 
as typical “women’s” jobs, mainly because of the different family roles of the two genders, 
this is no reason ex-ante to expect temporary jobs to be typical “women’s” jobs. The data will 
tell in which countries this turns out to be the case. Also, while women’s role in home 
production may imply that women have stronger preferences than men for part-time jobs, this 
does not necessarily imply different gender preferences for temporary jobs. It is probably fair 
to argue that from any worker's point of view, a permanent contract is at least as desirable as a 
temporary one, given that it would commit the firm rather than the worker to costly 
procedures in case of separation. 
 
 
4.2. The data 
 
We use data drawn from the European Community Household Panel Survey 
(ECHPS), whose coverage is currently the 15 EU member states, during six annual waves 
(1994-1999). This is an unbalanced household-based panel survey, containing information on 
a few thousands households per country per year.13 The employment section of the survey 
contains information on the type of jobs held by members of the selected households, 
including working hours, type of contract, fringe benefits, and earnings. Several indices of job 
satisfaction are also reported, either overall satisfaction or satisfaction with respect to specific 
job attributes, namely the quality of jobs, working hours, job security and earnings. 
For the purposes of our analysis we select all employees aged 16-64 with complete 
information on the type of employment contract they hold. Table 4.1 reports some summary 
statistics on the distribution of non-standard employment contracts across genders and the 
associated raw wage differentials. We are not exploiting the panel dimension of the data set 
here, and simply compute averages of relevant variables across individuals and waves for 
                                                 
13 The initial sample sizes are as follows. Austria: 3,380; Belgium: 3490; Denmark: 3,482; Finland: 
4,139; France: 7,344; Germany: 11,175; Greece: 5,523; Ireland: 4,048; Italy: 7,115; Luxembourg: 1,011; 
Netherlands: 5,187; Portugal: 4,881; Spain: 7,206; Sweden: 5,891; U.K.: 10,905. These figures are the number 
of household included in the first wave for each country, which corresponds to 1995 for Austria, 1996 for 
Finland, 1997 for Sweden, and 1994 for all other countries. 
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each country. The resulting sample statistics can be interpreted as medium run averages of the 
relevant variables.14 
The incidence of part-time work is much higher among women than among men. 
Except in Ireland, part-time incidence among men is everywhere below 5%, while for women 
it goes from about 9% in Portugal and Finland to 45% in the Netherlands. On average, more 
women work part-time in central and northern Europe than in the Mediterranean, while no 
major geographical pattern can be detected for men. 
We next present figures on involuntary part time, including all workers who declare 
that they hold a part-time job because they wanted but could not find a full-time one. When 
one takes into account the reason why men and women work part-time, a negative cross-
country correlation between the use of part-time work and the incidence of involuntary part-
time can be detected. In particular, in northern and central Europe part-time work is less likely 
to be perceived as involuntary than in the south, especially by women. Finland actually makes 
an exception to this general rule, behaving more like a southern than like a northern European 
country. 
The incidence of temporary work varies more across countries than across genders. In 
all countries considered except Spain, Portugal and Greece, on average slightly less than 10% 
of employed men hold temporary jobs. This proportion however rises to one fifth in Portugal 
and Greece, and to over one third in Spain. The relevant figures for women are slightly 
higher, but replicate quite closely this international pattern. 
Table 4.1 finally reports hourly wages in standard relative to non-standard jobs for 
both men and women. Full timers in northern Europe typically earn more than part-timers, but 
the wage differential switches in favour of part-timers when moving towards the south. 
Temporary workers everywhere earn less than permanent workers, and this is especially true 
in southern Europe. In particular, Spain is the country with both the highest incidence of 
temporary work and the highest wage penalty attached to it, around 70% for both men and 
women. 
                                                 
14 Note that the time covered by these data is different from the one in the data reported in section 2, so 
averages may differ. There might also be some sample bias and some differences due to the different collection 
methods, although this is unlikely to affect the averages much because samples are big and definitions standard. 
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4.3. The incidence of irregular jobs  
 
We next use multivariate analysis to look at how women perform relatively to men in 
their employment characteristics by estimating binary choice models for a number of job 
attributes. Table 4.2 reports the estimates of probit models for the probabilities of working 
part-time, being an involuntary part-time worker, and holding a fixed-term contract, 
controlling for a number of individual and job characteristics.  
All estimated equations include age and education effects, occupation, sector and year 
dummies, and control for the family composition of workers and previous unemployment 
spells. The effect of family characteristics is allowed to differ across genders, to pick up the 
component of employment arrangements that may be explained by the different family 
commitments of the two genders. Similarly, the age and education effects are interacted with 
the female dummy, as human capital may have different returns for men and women. The 
existence of previous unemployment spells is controlled for as non-standard employment 
arrangements (including part-time jobs or fixed-term contracts) tend to be held 
disproportionately more by those who have suffered a job loss or had spells of inactivity, due 
to the difficulty in finding regular employment (see Farber 1999). The reference category in 
all regressions reported is a single male without dependent children, so the reported 
coefficient in a given row is the difference in the outcome between an individual of that type 
and a single male without children.  
The first set of results presented in Table 4.2 shows that in all countries considered 
women are over-represented in part-time jobs. Among single individuals without dependent 
children, gender differences range from zero in Germany, Finland, Luxembourg and Greece, 
to 11% in Belgium. Such gender differences rise for those married without children (up to 
20% in the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland) and even more for those married with children 
(up to 33% in the Netherlands). Overall, gender differences tend to be more pronounced in 
northern Europe than in the South, especially for individuals with family ties. 
The use of part-time work for combining paid work and family or other commitments 
should be associated with a lower incidence of involuntary part-time, due to the lack of full-
time jobs available rather than the need to work shorter hours. We would therefore expect that 
in countries where family ties explain most of part-time incidence among women, women are 
less likely to declare themselves involuntary part-timers. 
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In the second set of estimates we run probit regressions for involuntary part-time work 
on the same observable characteristics used for the part-time equation. 15 Among single 
women, part-time is more likely to be involuntary than among single men in the UK, France, 
Italy and Spain. In particular, while this difference is around 10% in the UK, Italy and Spain, 
it increases to as much as 40% in France. In Portugal and Greece such difference is around 
15%, but not significant at conventional statistical levels (z-statistics are 1.42 and 1.23 
respectively). The relatively low number of observations for the involuntary part-time 
equations in Portugal and Greece could have made it hard to identify precisely these 
coefficients, and indeed very few other coefficients are significant in the two regressions. We 
therefore tried to exploit cross-country differences in order to estimate more precisely the 
incidence of involuntary part-time in Portugal and Greece, by pooling observations for the 
two countries and including one country dummy. In this case, the coefficient of interest 
becomes 0.198, with an associate z-statistic of 2.40. The estimated coefficients on all other 
types of individuals remain non-significant. 
Among those with family ties, women are less likely to be involuntary part-timers in a 
group of northern countries (Denmark, Finland and Ireland), for which gender differences in 
the incidence of involuntary part-time go in the expected direction. There are instead no 
significant gender differences in all other countries except France, where married women 
without children are actually 65% more likely than married men without children to be 
involuntary part-timers. 
The picture that emerges from the estimates of the two part-time equations can be 
broadly summarized by saying that in northern and central Europe, part-time among women is 
mostly explained by family ties and it is unlikely to be perceived as the consequence of a 
market constraint on the number of hours worked. On the contrary, in southern European 
countries (including, and especially, France) the explanatory power of family ties in female 
part-time employment is lower, and single women are more likely to be involuntary part-
timers than single men. These facts are much easier to reconcile with discrimination against 
women in regular, full- time jobs than with gender differences in preferences or comparative 
advantages. 
In the last set of results we look at the incidence of temporary work, using the same 
specification of the regression equation as for part-time work. Temporary work is more 
frequent among single women than single men in southern Europe, Ireland and Sweden, 
                                                 
15 No estimates are reported for Sweden, as information on reasons for part-time work is not available 
for this country in the ECHP, and for Luxembourg, due to the small sample size. 
  
 
25 
although the associated marginal effects are fairly small. Family ties reinforce this tendency, 
and the highest gender difference is detected for Spain, where married women with children 
are about 9% more likely than married men to hold a temporary contract. This result bears no 
clear interpretation in terms of family commitments of women, unless part-time jobs are 
typically covered by temporary contracts.  
We therefore explicitly consider the possibility that the use of temporary and part-time 
contracts is positively correlated across individuals (see OECD 2000, chapter 2). A simple 
probit regression of the probability of holding a fixed-term contract on a set of country 
dummies and a part-time dummy reveals that part-time workers are 15% more likely than 
full-time workers to hold a fixed-term contract, and this effect bears a t-statistic of 47.12. The 
absence of controls for this correlation in our main regression may bias our coefficients of 
interest as, for instance, we might obtain a significant gender effect in the fixed-term contract 
equation simply because women are more likely to work shorter hours and hold part-time 
jobs. We therefore estimated the part-time and the fixed-term contract equations 
simultaneously using a bivariate probit model. The estimated covariance between the error 
terms of the two equations is positive and significant at the 1% level for all countries 
considered (except Luxembourg, where it was only significant at the 10% level). 
Nevertheless, the sign and the significance of the gender and family variables remain 
unchanged from the previous specification, in which such covariance is ignored by the 
estimate. 
 
 
4.4 Preferences for irregular jobs  
 
Section 4.3 illustrated that, controlling for a number of individual and job 
characteristics, women tend to take the larger share of part-time jobs in all countries 
considered, and of temporary jobs in a smaller subset of countries. We mentioned in Section 
4.2 that an unequal allocation of genders across jobs may stem from comparative advantages, 
preferences, or employer discrimination. In the previous section we controlled for 
comparative advantages by conditioning outcomes on human capital and family 
characteristic s, whose effect on employment arrangements was allowed to differ across 
genders. In this section we address workers preferences. 
If the observed job allocation meets the preferences of the workers affected (and does 
not negatively affect their productivity) then one should conclude that workers sort 
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themselves efficiently across jobs. However, we have seen in the previous section that some 
fraction of female part-time work is indeed involuntary, as a full- time job would have been 
preferred to a part-time one but was not found. There is probably little to question about 
worker preferences for fixed-term contracts, as they should imply, if anything, lower job 
security than permanent contracts, with no obvious advantage for the workers involved.16 
In this section we use job satisfaction indicators to infer how worker utility is affected 
when holding a non-standard job. The ECHPS contains detailed information on several 
dimensions of job satisfaction (overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with earnings, job 
security, type of job, working hours, etc.). Each aspect of job satisfaction is measured on a 
scale from 1 to 5, from very dissatisfied to very satisfied, and we estimate corresponding 
ordered probit equations, including the usual individual and job characteristics on the right-
hand side, plus a part-time and a temporary contract control, interacted with gender. The 
results are reported in Table 4.3.  
A clear message from the first three panels of Table 4.3 is that part-time jobs tend to 
reduce job satisfaction (overall and with earnings) in southern Europe only (and they actually 
increase it in some northern European countries), while temporary jobs reduce satisfaction 
(overall, with earnings and with the type of job) everywhere, but more so in the South than in 
the North. 
Features which are most closely related to part-time or temporary jobs, like 
satisfaction with working hours and job security, are studied in panels 4 and 5 respectively. 
Concerning working hours, female part-timers in northern Europe are typically more satisfied 
than male part-timers with shorter working hours, while this only happens in a subset of 
southern European countries (Spain and Greece). As expected, holding a temporary job 
implies lower satisfaction with job security in all countries considered (and again this effect is 
stronger in southern Europe), and women are in this case even more negatively affected than 
men.  
The results of this section can be very broadly summarized saying that, as far as job 
satisfaction is concerned, part-time jobs are generally perceived as good as full- time jobs in 
central and northern Europe, and even better than full-time jobs by women in a few cases. On 
the contrary, in southern Europe they tend to be perceived as inferior. Temporary jobs reduce 
job satis faction everywhere, if anything more in the south than in the north. This result is 
                                                 
16 Possible exceptions are issues of commitment. Temporary work agencies often argue that their 
placements are for people who prefer temporary jobs as stop-gaps, with no commitment requirements. We do 
not, however, find evidence for this later on (although we also cannot differentiate between those holding 
temporary jobs through temporary work agencies and the rest). 
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interesting in light of the recent experiments of flexibility at the margin, implemented in a 
number of European countries through the introduction of temporary contracts.17 Increased 
labour market flexibility does not seem to have come without a cost in terms of job 
satisfaction, especially as far as job security is concerned. 
Furthermore, women’s job satisfaction is in a few cases less affected by non-standard 
contracts (when it comes to earnings and working hours, and mostly in northern Europe), and 
in others more affected (typically when it comes to job security). Overall, there is no 
widespread evidence that women are particularly happier (or less unhappy) than men on non-
standard jobs, which means that different gender preferences for jobs cannot go a long way in 
explaining women’s over-representation in non-standard jobs. 
 
 
4.5. Wages in non-standard jobs  
 
We finally assess the penalty in earnings, if any, associated with non-standard jobs by 
estimating wage equations for the two genders, including controls for part time and temporary 
work. Ideally, in order to assess the wage penalty from part-time work, one should use data on 
hourly wages for employees paid by the hour. In the ECHPS no information on hourly wages 
is available (nor on pay times), and we therefore use information on gross monthly earnings. 
We use (log) monthly wages as our dependent variable, and include both the (log) of weekly 
hours worked and the part-time dummy, as well as controls for temporary work and other 
usual characteristics, on the right-hand side:  
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where Wit denotes gross monthly earnings, Hit denotes normal monthly hours worked, PTit 
and TCit are controls for part time and temporary work, respectively, xit is a vector of 
individual and job characteristics, and eit is an error term. 
We will use this specification in order to assess any wage penalty (or premium) 
associated with non-standard jobs. While the effect of temporary contracts on wages can be 
                                                 
17 During the 1990s, temporary employment growth accounted for around a half of total employment 
growth in Finland, France, Spain and Portugal, and was actually higher than total employment growth in 
Germany and Italy (see OECD 2002, chapter 3) – all countries with relatively strict employment protection on 
permanent contracts (see OECD 1999, chapter 2). 
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simply picked by the a3 coefficient, the effect of part-time work entails both a regime switch, 
represented by the part-time dummy, and a change in working hours. Specifically, the 
coefficient on the part-time control a2 represents the change in (log) monthly earnings 
induced by the switch in working time from just above to just below the full-time threshold, 
without a discrete change in the number of hours worked. As earnings may not increase in the 
same proportion as the number of hours worked, this needs to be accounted for when 
assessing the wage penalty associated with part-time work, which typically involves a discrete 
change in the number of hours worked. 
For an individual with given characteristics, moving from a full- time to a part-time job 
implies a change in monthly wages given by a2-a1 ln(HFT/HPT), where HFT and HPT represent 
the working hours associated to full- and part-time work, respectively. The corresponding 
change in hourly wages is given by  
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which will be our measure of the hourly part-time penalty (and which denoted a premium 
when positive). To compute this, we will need estimates of the coefficients of interest a1 and  
a2 from the wage equations and values for HFT/HPT. Typical working hours on full- time and 
part-time jobs can be computed by taking averages of working hours for full- timers and part-
timers in each country. The resulting HFT/HPT ratio ranges from 1.73 in Germany to 2.14 in 
the UK. As a benchmark case, we set HFT/HPT=2 in our calculations, although virtually 
identical results were obtained when using actual values of HFT/HPT  for each country. 
Another important issue is the presence of measurement error in reported working 
hours (and consequently in the part-time status). As there are good reasons to believe that 
working hours may be measured with some error, this would induce an attenuation bias in our 
estimated coefficients and in particular understate the part-time penalty, as given in equation 
(2). To reduce the effect of measurement error we instrument both working hours and the 
part-time status by the values reported in the previous wave. The correlation between current 
and past working hours ranges (across countries) between 0.50 and 0.69 for males, and 
between 0.56 and 0.82 for females. The corresponding figures for part-time status are 0.51-
0.71 for males and 0.52-0.80 for females. It seems therefore that there is a fairly high 
correlation between the instruments and the variables potentially mismeasured, if anything 
higher for females than for males.  
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It may finally be argued that non random selection of individuals into our sample of 
wage earners may bias the estimates of interest, especially for women. Female labour market 
participation varies widely across countries and non random selection of women into the 
labour force implies that the composition of the female labour force also varies across 
countries. For example, assume that more educated women are more likely to participate in 
market work than the less-educated in any country. In a country with relatively low female 
participation (due, say, to social norms or family commitments) the educational cut-off level 
above which women participate is higher, and consequently the female labour force is on 
average more educated, than in a country with relatively high female participation. This has 
clear implications for international comparisons of gender wage gaps (see next section). Its 
implications for the gender-specific penalty to non-standard jobs are rather unexplored, 
although, in principle, a higher participation cut-off along the educational distribution may 
affect the skill composition of standard and non-standard employment and the related wage 
differentials.  
To explore this issue we correct our estimates for sample selection using Heckman’s 
(1979) two-step estimator. We first estimate a probit model for selection into employment, 
controlling for marital status, number of children under 14, number of employed members in 
the household, number of non-employed members in the household, either below or above 
age 65, other family income, age and education. The resulting inverse Mills’ ratio is then used 
as an extra regressor in the estimated wage equation. As Heckman’s correction for selectivity 
did not alter in any appreciable way the results of interest from the OLS regressions, the 
results reported do not control for selectivity. 
The OLS and IV estimates of our wage equations are reported in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, 
respectively, separately for males and females. The vector of controls xit includes marital 
status, number of dependent children under 14, education dummies, potential experience and 
its square, controls for public sector, employer size, previous unemployment spells, 
occupation, sector and year dummies.  
The OLS estimates of Table 4.4 give evidence of a significant penalty to temporary 
work for both men and women, ranging between 10 and 20 log points in most countries, if 
anything higher in southern Europe (excluding Portugal) and the Netherlands. The hourly 
part-time penalty is computed taking into account the coefficients on log(hours) and part-time 
status, as explained earlier, and is reported at the bottom of each panel. All positive figures 
indicate the presence of a part-time premium in hourly wages in most countries, and this is 
particularly strong in southern Europe.  
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As the number of hours worked and the part-time status may be measured with error, 
part of this outcome may be the consequence of an attenuation bias in the corresponding 
coefficients, which tends to overstate our measure of the part-time premium. We therefore use 
IV estimates in Table 4.5, and find that the penalty to temporary jobs is slightly reduced for 
both men and women (being still highest in the Netherlands and southern Europe), while the 
part-time premium is much reduced, and in most cases it becomes either negative or non-
significant. According to our estimates, there is a significant wage penalty to part-time work 
for men in the UK, the Netherlands, Ireland, France and Spain (in the range of 10-25 log 
points). In other countries, such differential is either non-significant (namely in Finland, 
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal) or still positive (in Belgium, Austria, Italy 
and Greece, being in the range of 15-25 log points). The international pattern of part-time 
wage differentials for women resembles that of men, although at a somewhat higher level. 
The existence of large wage premia to part-time work is fairly unexpected, especially 
in the light of job satisfaction indicators, which would point at a strong wage penalty to part-
time work in southern Europe (see Table 4.3). Interestingly, it can be noted that for the four 
countries where such premia are detected the OLS and the IV estimates of the part-time 
premium are fairly similar. It can probably be argued that the instruments used are less 
adequate for these countries, and that measurement error is still affecting the IV estimates. We 
will come back to this issue below. 
Concerning gender differences in the penalty/premium to non-standard jobs, it seems 
that women’s earnings are less negatively affected by temporary work than men’s earnings in 
all countries except the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece. If 
women are relatively more discriminated than men in standard jobs, women should earn 
lower relative wages in standard jobs than men or, equivalently, face lower wage penalties in 
non-standard jobs. This seems to happen in 8 out of 14 countries. In the 6 remaining countries 
the reverse happens. The explanation could be that there are variations across countries in the 
type of discrimination exercised over different types of workers and jobs. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that part of the wage penalty to temporary contracts 
estimated in Table 4.5 includes the effect of some unobserved heterogeneity. If workers who 
take temporary jobs have some characteristics not picked up by the survey with an associated 
wage penalty, the estimates for the penalty to temporary contracts would be overstated. In 
particular, cases in which women suffer from a higher penalty from temporary jobs are 
consistent with a scenario in which women are more heavily sorted across jobs according to 
their unobservable characteristics (e.g. motivation, labour market attachment), and therefore 
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their wage gap with respect to men becomes stronger. Similarly, If employers tend to use 
temporary contracts to cover low quality jobs, and this tendency is stronger when the job is 
occupied by a woman, we should expect women to be more heavily pena lized than men when 
taking temporary jobs. While very little can be done to control for job unobserved 
heterogeneity, fixed-effect estimates, which exploit the wage variation for workers who move 
jobs, provide a way to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. When we repeated our 
IV estimates introducing fixed-effects, the penalty to temporary jobs remains higher for 
women than for men only in Spain and Greece, the two countries with the highest incidence 
of temporary work. Unobserved job heterogene ity may indeed help explain this result, 
although at this stage we can only speculate about it. Job satisfaction indicators on type of job 
show that Spanish women on temporary contracts are even less satisfied than men with the 
quality of their jobs, which indeed may be consistent with higher penalties to temporary work 
for women than for men (see Table 4.3, panel 3). The same argument, however, would not 
hold for Greece, where the gender differential in job satisfaction goes in the opposite 
direction. 
Finally, the wage differentials between full- and part-timers are everywhere lower for 
women except in those four countries in which we obtained a significant premium to part-
time work, namely Belgium, Austria, Italy and Greece. But as part-time jobs are indeed 
perceived as “women’s” jobs in most countries, it would be odd to argue that women are 
more discriminated in part-time rather than full- time jobs, which is possibly a further reason 
to believe that the high male part-time premia in these countries reflect measurement error in 
the number of hours worked rather than genuine differentials (and, again, further evidence can 
be gathered from the job satisfaction indicators, which show that female part-timers are less 
dissatisfied with earnings than male part-timers). 
 
 
4.6. Conclusions  
 
Two main results emerge from our analysis of job segregation. First, part-time and 
temporary jobs display systematic features that make them significantly different from 
standard jobs. In particular, part-time jobs are dominated by full-time ones in terms of job 
satisfaction and earnings in southern Europe, and temporary jobs are dominated virtually 
everywhere by permanent jobs, but differences are more marked for southern European 
countries. 
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Second, given than women are over-represented in such non-standard jobs in most 
countries considered, systematic features of these jobs may be an important factor of gender 
discrimination. Our results show that job segregation may be a symptom of gender 
discrimination in southern Europe, as it is not fully explained by different preferences or 
productivities of the two genders. By contrast, in central and northern Europe, non standard 
work is either less widespread (as in the case of temporary work), or seems to better mirror 
women’s preferences for shorter working hours (as in the case of part-time work) and thus 
should not be a signal of gender discrimination in the labour market. 
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5. Wage gaps 
 
In this section we focus on the gender wage gap which, together with the employment 
gap discussed in the previous section, is also an important indicator of the relative 
performance of women in the labour market.  The gender wage gap gained added importance 
in Europe when it was included in a revised list of “structural indicators” for employment, 
following the Stockholm European Council in 2002. 
The study of the gender wage gap has attracted considerable attention in the literature, 
and most research has focused on changes in gender wage differentials over time for the US. 
Studies of the gender wage gap and its evolution emphasize the importance of gender 
differences in human capital (education and experience), and in the occupational structure by 
gender in explaining the pay gap. The residual wage gap, which is left unexplained after 
accounting for differences in observed characteristics for men and women, is attributed to 
discrimination in the labour market. In addition, a number of authors have discussed the link 
between the gender wage gap and aggregate changes in wage inequality and in industry 
composition during the 1980s and 1990s.18  
Despite the richness of this literature, we only have a few extensive cross-country 
studies of the gender wage gap.  Up to the early 1990s this was partly due to the absence of a 
fully comparable cross-sectional data set on the employment and earnings of men and women. 
However, recent studies by Blau and Kahn (1996, 2002) and the OECD (Economic Outlook, 
2002) use comparable cross-country data (the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 
data and the European Community Household Panel respectively) to study the effects of 
differences in the wage structure on the relative gender wage gap.  Both Blau and Kahn 
(1996) and OECD (2002) use the decomposition method developed by Juhn, Murphy and 
Pierce (1991) in order to obtain “adjusted” measures of the wage gap that control for between-
country variations in the female/male differences in observed characteristics (age, education, 
experience) and in jobs held, and in the extent of “equal pay” for similar (observed) 
characteristics. According to this decomposition technique, the “comparability” problem is 
solved by choosing one country as a benchmark and by using the entire wage structure for the 
reference group in the reference country (typically men) to evaluate “gaps” in observed and 
                                                 
18 See Goldin (1990) for an influential historical analysis of the gender wage gap in the US, and Altonji 
and Blank  (1999) for an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature that examines the 
determinants of differences in pay across demographic groups (in particular the black/white and female/male 
wage differentials).  
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unobserved characteristics by gender across different states. 19  The application of such 
methodology to the analysis of the gender pay gap may be problematic since it is assumed 
that the estimated prices of observed characteristics do not differ by gender. Blau and Kahn 
(2002) try to deal with this issue by estimating gender specific wage equations for each 
country and by using the observed characteristics of a reference state to evaluate cross-
country differences in the wage gap. These studies suggest a link between wage inequality 
and the gender pay gap.   
Here, we use data from the 1998 wave of the ECHP to investigate the importance of 
adjusting for cross-country differences in patterns of female participation in cross-country 
studies of the gender wage gap. Moreover, we examine the role of country-specific 
institutions, such as employment protection policies, parental leave policies, and product 
market regulation, in explaining differences in the gender wage gap across countries. 
This section is organized in three parts. In the first part we briefly talk about the US 
experience. We then turn to a first analysis of cross-country differences in the gender wage 
gap for the countries in our sample. For a subset of countries we also study how the gender 
wage gap has evolved between the mid 1980s and the late 1990s. In the second part, we turn 
to the decomposition analysis of cross-country gender differences in pay and we discuss how 
the issue of sample selection may be affecting cross-country comparisons even of the 
“adjusted” wage gap. Finally, in the third part, we study the effect of country-specific 
institutions on cross-country differences in the gender wage gap. 
 
 
5.1. The evolution of the gender wage gap in the US 
 
In the United States the ratio of mean female earnings to mean male earnings among 
full-time workers has been hovering around 60% from the mid 1950s to the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  Starting in the 1980s, we observe a steady and rapid increase in the relative 
earnings of women. By 2001, women’s earnings were about 80% of men’s earnings.   
Traditionally, women were more likely to withdraw from the labour market after 
marriage or after giving birth. The consensus estimate was that about half of the traditional 
40% differential in wages could be explained by the difference in experience (Goldin and 
Polachek (1987)). The major explanation for the stability of the female/male wage differential 
                                                 
19 The same framework has also been used to compare the gender wage gap in Australia and Canada, 
Kidd and Shannon (1996), and to compare Sweden and the US, Edin and Richardson (2002). 
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through the 1970s was that the new groups of women that started entering the labour force 
during that period typically had lower education and lower labour market experience then 
those already in the market (Goldin (1990), Smith and Ward (1989)).  However, during the 
1980s and the 1990s, women’s observable characteristics and, in particular their labour 
market experience and their educational level, became closer to that of men. Moreover, over 
these two decades, women also shifted to higher-paying occupations.  This relative 
improvement in the observable characteristics of the female labour force contributed to the 
narrowing of the gap during the late 1980s.  Studies by Blau and Kahn (1997) and O’Neil and 
Polachek (1993) show that both the increase in the rate of return to labour market experience 
and the increase in actual experience for women can explain a large portion of the decreasing 
gender wage gap. These studies show that convergence in work-related characteristics 
(education and experience) may account for about one third to a half of the drop in the gender 
gap. They also find a decline in the residual (unexplained) differential. This has been 
interpreted as evidence of a decline in discrimination. Part of the argument is that the effect of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and of the subsequent institution of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, were delayed, and resulted in increased earning for women in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
 
5.2. Cross-country evidence on the gender wage gap  
 
There are substantial differences in the gender wage gap across countries. Table 5.1 
presents 1998 data on the female/male earnings ratio for both full-time wage and salary 
employees, and for all the wage and salary workers (including part-time workers).20  The table 
shows that, for both measures, women’s hourly earnings are lower than men’s in all of the 
countries. On average, women are paid an hourly wage equal to 84% of men’s pay. Moreover, 
the gender gap is smallest (less than 10%) in the Mediterranean countries, in the Nordic 
countries and in Belgium and France.  On the contrary, the gender gap is largest (around 20%) 
in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. For the UK, Spain and Ireland the 
gender gap for all workers is about five percentage points higher than for full time workers.  
This reflects the fact that a large fraction of women work in part-time jobs in these countries, 
                                                 
20 Source: OECD, Employment Outlook (2002). We only present results for the ratio of median hourly 
earnings since this measure is less sensitive to the presence of outliers. See the OECD report for data on the 
female/male ratios of means hourly earnings and the 20th and 80th percentiles of the hourly wage distribution.  
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and (consistent with our earlier econometric results for these countries) part-time workers 
receive lower hourly wages.  However, this is not the case for the other countries particularly 
for the Netherlands, where the incidence of part-time jobs is high and where we also found a 
part-time penalty in our econometric work. 
In order to investigate this issue further, we summarize information about the 
female/male wage differential in both hourly and monthly wages in Table 5.2. This is 
particularly relevant because not only are women more likely to work part-time than men, but 
also they tend to work less hours when holding full- time jobs. In addition, we break down this 
information by age to study whether more recent generations of women face a smaller pay 
penalty on the labour market. The table shows that, for every country and every age group, 
the monthly gender pay gap tends to be about 10 percentage points larger than the hourly 
wage gap. This difference is largest in the Netherlands and in the UK, where older women’s 
monthly pay is about 50% of men’s pay.  The difference between the hourly and the monthly 
gender gap is smallest in the USA (where the gap in hours worked by men and women is 
lower), followed by Mediterranean and Nordic countries.  The table also shows that for most 
of the countries, except for the Mediterranean countries, the monthly female/male wage 
differential tends to be around 10 percentage points higher for young, 25 to 34 years old, 
women than for older women. Both age and cohort effects are at work here. First, young 
women tend to be more similar to young men in terms of accumulated labour market 
experience. Second, for the recent generations, the education gap has narrowed substantially.21 
 Finally, we turn to the analysis of how the gender wage gap has evolved between the 
mid 1980s and the late 1990s. Table 4.3 presents data on the growth of the female/male 
(median) earnings ratio for a subset of countries.22 The gender wage gap has been declining in 
most of the countries in our sample since the late 1970s/early 1980s.  The largest decline 
occurred in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Canada. Over this 
time period, the wage gap was essentially constant in Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden), and 
in Italy -- the only country in the Mediterranean group for which we have time series data.  
This is an interesting result since both the strong decline in the gender wage gap in the US, 
and the stagnation in Nordic countries, occurred at a time of rising wage inequality that by 
                                                 
21 See section 1 of this report and Dolado, Felgueroso and Jimeno (2002). 
22 Source: OECD, Labour Force Statistics (online).  
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itself tends to increase the gender wage gap. Hence, while US women improved their position 
in the earning distribution relative to men, women in the Nordic countries did not.23   
To conclude, despite the increase in the female-male earning ratio during the 1980s 
and the 1990s, by the end of the 1990s the North American gender ratio was still below its 
level for Italy, Spain (where the gender gap in employment is almost three times as large as in 
the U.S.), and the Nordic countries (where the job segregation index is much larger than in the 
U.S.).  The next section discusses work by Blau and Kahn (1996, 2003) and by the OECD 
(2002), which explores this contradictory evidence.  
 
 
5.3. Explaining the cross-country evidence on the gende r wage gap  
 
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that although U.S. women perform quite 
well in terms of human capital and occupational structure relative to their European 
counterparts, they face a much larger wage penalty relative to men than European women do. 
Blau and Kahn (1996) highlight the importance of country differences in wage structure in 
accounting for cross-country differences in the gender wage gap. According to their 
argument, since women tend to be more concentrated at the bottom of the wage distribution 
relative to men, institutions that compress the wage distribution, such as minimum wage 
legislation and highly centralized wage-setting, will also tend to decrease the gender wage 
gap. 
In their 1996 study, they use 1985-1989 ISSP data for 10 countries, supplemented by 
country-specific micro data sets for Italy, Sweden, and the U.S., to analyse the importance of 
the overall wage structure in explaining cross-country differences in the gender wage gap. In 
particular, they study the reasons underlying the lower ranking of U.S. women relative to their 
European counterparts on this dimension. 24 
From a methodological standpoint, Blau and Kahn adapt the decomposition analysis 
that Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) used in their study of wage differential by demographic 
groups to a cross-country setting. The procedure may be summarized as follows, first the 
wage equation for men is estimated in each country. These regressions provide benchmark 
                                                 
23 See Blau and Kahn (2000), Datta Gupta, Oaxaca, and Smith (2001), and OECD, Employment 
Outlook (2002). 
24 The data set considered are the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household and Income Wealth, the 
Michigan Panel Study if Income Dynamics (PSID) for the U.S. and the Swedish Household Market and Non-
Market Activities Survey (HUS).  The other countries included in the analysis are: Australia, Austria, Germany, 
Hungary, Norway, Switzerland and the UK.   
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estimates of the price of observed characteristic and its level of residual wage inequality for 
each country. 25 The gender wage gap difference between two countries may be decomposed 
into four terms. The first term measures the contribution of cross-country differences in 
observed characteristics (mainly education, and experience). The second term measures the 
contribution of differences in the “price” of observed characteristics, namely the return they 
command in the market. The third term measures the effects of cross-country differences in 
the relative rank ing of women within the male residual wage distribution, obtained after 
controlling for observed characteristics (given the assumption that the male residual wage 
inequality is the same across countries). Finally, the fourth term measures the cross-country 
difference in the gender wage gap that would be explained by differences in residual 
inequality (if the two countries are characterized by the same relative ranking of women in the 
male residual wage distribution). The sum of the second and fourth term represents the total 
effect of the wage structure (the sum of both observed and unobserved prices effects). The 
sum of the first and third term represents the total effect of gaps in gender differences in 
observed characteristics and of differences in the “t reatment” of women in the labour market. 
The estimation results obtained for this subset of countries show how US women 
perform better than their counterparts along this latter dimension (except for Australia and 
Sweden). However, the US level of inequality in the wage structure makes their relative 
position worse. The effect of the wage inequality accounts for almost all the higher US pay 
gap for all countries except for Sweden where it accounts for 74% of the gap. The authors 
interpret this evidence as suggestive of the fact that differences in wage structure can account 
for a large part of the cross-country gender wage gap. Moreover, they analyse the relationship 
between cross-country differences in wage setting institutions, male wage inequality, and 
cross-country differences in the wage gap and find some suggestive (although weak) evidence 
that supports their conjecture. 
In a more recent paper Blau and Kahn (2003) test their hypothesis for a larger set of 
22 countries, from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) for the years 1984-1994. 
They use a slightly different methodology to compare gaps across countries, and allow for the 
prices of observed characteristics to differ across countries and across gender groups but use 
the observed characteristics of men and women in the US as the benchmark. Moreover, they 
also include in the analysis measures of the net supply of labour by women across countries. 
In this case, they find stronger evidence that the variation in gender gap across countries may 
                                                 
25 Men are chosen as a reference group within each country in order to minimize the sample selection 
bias.  
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be attributed to differences in the degree of inequality in the earnings distribution. They also 
show that, controlling for differences in the wage structure, the wage differential tends to be 
lower when female supply of labour is lower with respect to its demand. This result is robust 
to the inclusion of institutional variables, collective bargaining, parental leave policies, 
unemployment insurance and employment protection. This evidence confirms that to the 
extent that labour market institutions are an important component in explaining the degree of 
overall wage inequality, differences in the labour market institutions can account for 
differences in the gender wage gap.26 
A similar analysis is conducted for the 12 countries in the ECHP in the 2002 OECD 
Employment Outlook.  In particular, this study uses the same decomposition method used in 
Blau and Kahn (1996) and considers an average of the 12 ECHP countries as the benchmark 
economy. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 5.4. Entries in the first column 
of the table represent percentage point differences of the unadjusted wage gap in each country 
from the wage gap in the benchmark economy. The second column represents the total 
contribution due to differences in the gender gap in observed and unobserved characteristics. 
Entries in the third column of the table represent the sum of the contributions due to cross-
country differences in market prices for observed and unobserved characteristics. 
The results of this decomposition analysis show that the unadjusted wage gap would 
substantially change in each country if its wage structure were similar to that of the average 
benchmark country. In particular, the gender wage gap in the UK would be reduced by 
between 2 and 4 percentage points under the benchmark (more compressed) wage structure. 
On the contrary, the adjusted wage gap would increase in the Netherlands as a consequence of 
women’s higher concentration in lower paid occupational groups. There is also evidence that 
less-dispersed wage structures are not necessarily beneficial to women relative to men. For 
instance, women tend to have a strong presence in the public sector where wages tend to be 
higher than in the private sectors (at least for lower educational levels). Hence, countries such 
as Belgium, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, where the public/private wage 
differential is lower, tend to display higher adjusted wage gaps with respect to the benchmark 
economy. 
The analysis also shows that this adjusted measure of the gender wage gap confirms 
the evidence presented in the previous section for unadjusted measures of the female/male 
earning differential: the gender wage gap tends to be smaller for the Mediterranean countries 
                                                 
26 For example, if collective bargaining coverage were to increase from 47% to 82% the gender wage 
gap would fall by .10 log points. Higher collective bargaining is known to compress the overall wage structure. 
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(Greece, Italy, and Spain) than for the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries (including the 
U.S.). 
 
 
5.4. The importance of sample selection 
 
The analysis described above shows that both the raw gender wage gap and the 
adjusted wage gap are smaller in Mediterranean countries, where women’s participation rate 
is particularly low.  We argue that part of the reason why this may occur is that this type of 
analysis does not take into account cross-country differences in how women select (positively 
or negatively) into employment. 
In what follows we compare the gender wage gap estimates, obtained both with and 
without the sample-selection correction, for the same subset of European countries analysed 
in the OECD study. The wage gap is computed as the difference between the male and female 
average log hourly earnings, which is obtained by estimating gender and country specific 
equations. In such equations, the dependent variable is the logarithm of gross hourly wages,27 
and the independent variables include education (two dummies), potential experience, and 
potential experience squared, occupation (fifteen dummies), tenure (four dummies) 
public/private sector, type of contract, full time/part time, and interaction terms between part 
time, full time and weekly hours worked. We exclude individuals working as apprentices and 
students as well as self-employed. The estimates corrected for sample selections are based on 
Heckman’s two-step consistent estimator. The participation equation includes age, marital 
status, education (two dummies), and weekly hours spent in childcare. 
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 5.5. The estimated “raw” gender 
gap is reported in the first column. Estimates for the gender wage gap corrected for sample 
selection are in the second column. Once we account for sample selection the estimated 
gender wage gap increases by as much as a factor of two in Mediterranean countries. In 
contrast, it falls substantially in the Nordic countries and is unchanged in the UK, Netherlands 
and Portugal. Intuitively, the sample correction takes care of the fact that the wage gap differs 
across skill groups. With the large differences in the participation rate in the Mediterranean 
and (say) Nordic countries, the average gap could be distorted if the calculation did not 
                                                 
27 Following the OECD report, we compute hourly earnings by dividing gross monthly earnings in the 
main job by 52/12 and then dividing the corresponding weekly wage by the actual hours worked per week. The 
“selected” sample is restricted to individuals working 15+ hours per week.   
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correct for the different composition of the female labour force in each case. Evidently, since 
the fraction of skilled women who participate in the Mediterranean countries is relatively 
larger than in the Nordic countries, our results say that the gender gap is bigger in the 
unskilled occupations. A simple average in the Mediterranean countries shows a small gap 
because there are not enough unskilled women to make the gap larger. Our results suggest 
that in cross-country analyses of the gender wage gap (as well as in the analysis of the gender 
wage gap across demographic groups) it is important to adjust for cross-country differences in 
patterns of female participation. 28 
 
 
5.5. Cross-country institutional differences and the gender wage gap 
 
In line with our earlier work on the institutional influences on the overall employment 
rate across countries, we investigate, in this section, whether institutional differences across 
countries, such as employment protection policies, parental leave policies, and product market 
regulation, can explain any of the cross-country differences in the gender wage gap.  We use a 
variety of data sources to build the set of institutional variables for the 1990s. The index of 
bargaining coverage is from Blanchflower (1996). Parental leave entitlements (weeks of 
leave), employment protection policy (EPL), and union density are from Nickell and Layard 
(1999).  The information on parental leave entitlements for Greece is obtained from the 
OECD Employment Outlook (1990), Table 5.8. The index of product market regulation, and 
the index of employment protection legislation for both temporary and regular contracts are 
taken from Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (1999).  The maximum unemployment insurance 
(UI) replacement rates are from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) where they construct this (time 
varying) measure of the generosity of the unemployment insurance as an average of the 
replacement rate, the number of years over which unemployment benefits are paid, and a 
measure of active labour market policy.  The segregation index is from Anker (1998), Table 
9.1, and it is based on a set of 75 non-agricultural two-digit occupations. Finally, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity indicator (EEO) is based on Table 5.11 in the 1988 OECD 
Employment Outlook . The table provides information about the year in which the equal 
employment opportunity legislation was introduced in each country. We use the indicator to 
                                                 
28 This is consistent with the work by Derek Neal (2002) which emphasizes the importance of adjusting 
measures of the black-white wage gap among women for racial differences in selection patterns.  
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measure the time lag since this legislation was passed in each country. Unfortunately we do 
not have cross-country measures of the degree of enforcement of this legislation. 
We perform a cross-country regression of the estimated “raw” gender gap presented in 
Table 5.4 on this set of institutional variables. Our measure of the gender gap is derived from 
the estimates of wage equations that control for gender- and country-specific differences in 
education, potential experience and its square, occupation, tenure, public/private sector, type 
of contract, full time/part time, and interaction terms between part time, full time and weekly 
hours worked. The correction is for both men and women and for all the countries in our 
sample. For this analysis we exclude individuals working as apprentices and students and we 
restrict our attention to individuals working 15+ hours per week. 
Table 5.6 describes the results obtained for two different specifications. We report the 
results for three different age categories: 25-34, 35-44, and 45-54.  These results should to be 
interpreted with caution because the sample size is very small. We have data on all the 
institutions only for a subset of 11 countries. We show the results for two different 
specifications. In the first one we include parental leave, bargaining coverage, maximum 
replacement ratio, the EEO indicator, and the two measures of employment protection (for 
temporary, and regular jobs). In the second, we also control for the index of product market 
regulation. We find that more generous measures of the unemployment insurance system and 
measures of employment protection for temporary jobs both tend to decrease gender wage 
gap.  However, these effects disappear once we control for the degree of product market 
regulation. 
It is interesting to study how the results vary by age groups. For women between 35 
and 44 years old we find that, consistent with Blau and Kahn (2002), larger bargaining 
coverage decreases the gender gap in wages.  However, this is not the case for younger 
women (25 to 34).  In this case, a lager degree of bargaining coverage tends to increase the 
gap. Stricter EPL for regular contracts have the same effect. This is consistent with the story 
that these institutions, designed to protect the “insiders” in the labour market, have a larger 
negative impact on the employment and pay opportunities of the young. The results suggest 
that the negative effect is larger for young women than for young men. Also, for this age 
group, we find that stricter EPL for temporary contracts and a larger UI benefit replacement 
ratio both tend to decrease the gap.29   
                                                 
29  Results for specifications that include union density, and benefit duration are not reported since these 
two variables are always not significant and they do not add predictive power. 
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Finally we find that for 35 to 44 year old women more generous parental leave 
entitlements tend to significantly increase the gender wage gap. This finding is consistent with 
the evidence provided by Ruhm (1998) who shows that parental leave is associated with 
higher overall female employment (consistent with out finding with respect to family day care 
in section 3), but with reductions in their relative (female/male) wage.  
Given the small number of observations, these results should be interpreted as 
suggestive evidence of these associations rather than firm conclusions. In order to overcome 
somewhat the data constraint we use a variety of data sources to construct a data set of 
repeated cross-country observations.  Unfortunately, in this case we cannot estimate the 
gender wage gap so we use aggregate information on the male/female wage ratio obtained by 
using median earnings for full-time workers as the dependent variable in our analysis.  The 
subset of countries for which we have information includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, and 
the USA. We consider three time periods, 1980, 1990 and 1998.30  
We estimate the following regression: 
 
jtjjttjjt ebXggfWG +++= '*  
 
where j is a country index, and t is a period index. The dependent variable is the gender wage 
gap for country j at time t, and it  is measured as the log of the male/female wage ratio 
(median earnings for full-time year-round workers).  fj  is the country fixed effect, gt is the 
year dummy, and Xj is a vector of country-specific time-invariant institutions, with the 
exception of the maximum replacement ratio, and the indicators of EPL for temporary and 
regular contract that have a time dimension.  
Table 5.7 summarises the results obtained for this cross sectional, time series 
regression for 15 countries. The number of observations now increases to 36. The coefficients 
in the table should be interpreted as the marginal effect of each institution on the difference in 
the gender wage gap growth between 1980 and 1998. We consider three different 
specifications. In the first one we control for the degree of bargaining coverage, parental leave 
entitlements, EPL, union density and the EEO lag index. In the second specification we add 
the index of product market regulation to the above lis t. Finally, in the third specification we 
                                                 
30 Sources: 1980 and 1990: Blau and Kahn (2000), data for Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain refer 
to 1994, Source: ECHP. Data for 1998 are from OECD, Employment Outlook (2002) 
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introduce the measure of gender segregation.  For each specification we run the regression 
both with and without country fixed effects.  
We find that union bargaining coverage tend to decrease the gender wage gap both in 
the first and in the second specification (with and without fixed effects). Once again, this is 
consistent with the argument put forth by Blau and Kahn (2003) that since women tend to be 
more concentrated at the bottom of the wage distribution relative to men, institutions that 
compress the wage distribution will also tend to decrease the gender wage gap.    
We also find that more generous parental leave policies tend to significantly increase 
the wage gap (although this effect disappears once we include country fixed effects in the 
regression).  In the first specification we find that higher union density tend to increase the 
gap. Finally, when we control for sex segregation by occupation but none of these institutions 
has a significant impact on cross-country differences in the gender wage gap. 
 
 
5.6. Conclusions  
 
Our analysis of the gender wage gap has shown that significant differentials in the pay 
of men and women remain in Europe. Although the wage gap is not as large as in America, 
the reasons are probably not due to less discrimination against women in Europe but to the 
fact that because wage inequality is bigger in the United States, the mean earnings of men and 
women are also further apart. Unions appear to close some of the wage gap – though our 
analysis is not able to distinguish between this as an objective of union policy or as an 
outcome of the fact that unions tend to compress the wage structure. We also found that 
although Mediterranean countries at first sight are characterised by lower wage gaps than the 
rest of Europe, this result is not robust to corrections for the fact that in the Mediterranean 
countries female participation rates are lower and concentrated among more skilled women. 
Gender gaps are bigger at lower skills and when we correct for the small number of unskilled 
women who participate in southern Europe the wage gap widens to that of other European 
countries.
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6. The consequences of rising female participation for other 
workers 
 
 
In the world of the neoclassical macroeconomic growth, with each country 
characterized by constant returns to scale, a rise in female participation induced by factors that 
are exogenous to the labour market (such as the more general availability of consumer 
durables and other factors discussed in section 3) might in the short run reduce the wages of 
all labour, but in the medium to long run the capital stock rises to catch up with the higher 
labour supply. Even if we ignore the possibility of more research and innovation induced by 
the presence of more women in universities and research laboratories, the higher female 
supply is neutral. But there is a lot of heterogeneity in the labour market, and it is unlikely that 
the rise in female labour will affect all demographic and skill groups equally. We saw that 
women segregate into some sectors of the economy and their skills are different from those of 
men. It is likely that women complement some types of labour and compete with others. To 
give two rather obvious examples, the entry of women into the labour force creates demand 
for child care units, so complements the labour used to run those units, but creates 
competition for retail assistants, because retailing is one of the popular destinations for 
women.  
In this section we consider the consequences of an exogenous rise in the female 
participation rate, say one induced by social norms or developments outside the labour 
market, for the employment and wages of other demographic groups. As in previous sections, 
we first review the evidence, which comes mostly from the United States, and then present 
some original work of our own as it applies to Europe. 
 
 
6.1. What do we know? 
 
An increase in the supply of female workers is not a homogenous increase in labour 
supply. In the United States, the median hourly wage of women is around the 32nd percentile 
of the distribution of hourly wages of men, while the median male hourly wage is at the 75th 
percentile of women’s wages (source CPS, 1991 and author’s calculations). In this sense, the 
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average woman tends to crowd out the labour market for low-wage workers: possibly, 
unskilled men workers and younger workers. If wages are a good proxy for productivity 
women appear to be less skilled than the average worker. We saw that there is evidence of 
some discrimination against women. But even if we account for this, the relative rank of the 
median women will not rise to the rank of the median man. Is this a valid inference and are 
women therefore competing only with unskilled men and youths? 
Some early estimates of production functions with different labour inputs were carried 
out in the United States and surveyed by Hamermesh and Grant (1979). Some disaggregated 
by gender allowing for an estimate of any congestion effects caused by women. Freeman 
(1979) introduced female workers as an explicit factor of production, but he did not find 
significant substitutability between younger male workers and women. This conclusion was 
challenged by Grant and Hamermesh (1982) who estimated a trans- log production function 
across industries with gender and race groups as well as physical capital. They found a strong 
substitutability between adult white women and younger workers. Their estimates suggest that 
the consequence of a 10 per cent exogenous increase in the supply of female workers reduces 
the wage rate of younger workers by 1.5 per cent and would reduce their employment rate by 
as much as 50 per cent if their wage was totally rigid. Not surprisingly, they find this number 
“unbelievably large”. Berger (1983) also investigates the impact of changes in the 
composition of the labour force, by differentiating in addition by education and introducing 
capital. He introduces women as a single, homogenous group and finds that female workers 
are strong substitutes for both young male workers with a high school degree and young male 
college-educated workers31. He also finds some evidence of significant but weaker 
substitutability between older men with a high school degree and women. Topel (1994a and 
b) relaxes the assumption of homogeneity for women and also finds substitutability between 
low-skill women (first half of their wage distribution) and low-skill men (first 33rd percentile 
of their wage distribution). He also found substitutability between higher-skill women (say 
half of the skilled distribution) and two groups of men (1-33rd percentiles and 34th-66th 
percentiles). Topel (1997), surveying these results, claims that had women’s participation 
remained constant, wages of the less skilled men would not have declined, although he points 
out some drawbacks of this conclusion, notably in terms of timing of the changes in supply 
and returns to skills that do not coincide perfectly. 
                                                 
31 Young workers are defined as those with less than 15 years of experience. 
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There are very few similar studies for Europe. Given wage rigidities at the lower end 
of the wage distribution, the main effects of more female labour supply on unskilled workers 
and youths should be primarily on their unemployment rates. In Wasmer (2001b), the share of 
women in the labour force is found to have a significant positive impact on the unemployment 
rate of young workers in a cross-section of countries. Further, there is evidence of an inverted 
U-shaped interaction term with respect to the degree of decentralization of wage bargaining: 
flexible labour markets and highly centralized ones (Austria, Sweden) seem to have better 
accommodated rising female participation in terms of youth employment. 
In terms of human capital, women tend to be better educated on average and tend to 
have higher returns to education. Given that women earn generally less than men in all 
occupations, the latter fact is another way of saying that the ratio of the wages of low-skill 
women to the wages of low-skill men is less than the corresponding ratio for high-skill 
workers. 
Rising female participation has also some implications for the  supply of on-the-job 
skills and experience of the labour market. In Wasmer (2003), a measure of the supply of 
experience based on French and US individual data is computed: it is the average across the 
active population of the contribution of experience to individual wages. A measure of the 
supply of education can be computed in the same way, as the contribution of education to 
wages. The outcome is that, in both countries, the supply of education increased fast in the 
last 30 years, while the supply of experience declined until the mid 80’s, and then recovered 
in the late 80’s and in the 90’s, i.e. a U-shaped pattern in time. It is shown that the supply of 
experience almost perfectly negatively co-moves with the returns to experience in the US, 
indicating that labour supply factors dominate over labour demand factors. 
In the study above, the supply of experience is not only due to rising female 
participation: it is also driven by the baby-boom cohorts, changing the age composition of the 
labour force in the late 70’s. However, isolating higher female participation leads to the same 
U-shape pattern: women have both lower experience and lower returns to experience in 
earnings than men (the difference is about 30 to 50 per cent per year worked), and thus a rise 
in female participation reduces the average efficiency units of experience, due to a simple 
composition effect. In the late 80’s and in the 90’s, the evolution of experience is different. 
Women have longer and more stable careers, which leads to an inversion of the trend: the 
quality of female participation has improved, improving the human capital content of the 
labour force. 
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As an additional check of the U-shaped evolution of experience, Wasmer (2001a) 
calculated the supply of experience based on a ‘perpetual inventory method’: experience is 
seen as a sum of past participation rates, possibly discounted to account for human capital 
depreciation. This method is applied to eight OECD countries with sufficiently long time 
series, and in almost all of them, a similar pattern emerges from the data. Further, this 
measure of experience correlates positively with relative employment rates of workers less 
than 29 years old, a reflection of the congestion effects described below: scarce experience 
reduces the relative demand for younger workers if they are complement with older, more 
experienced workers. 
In the short-run, i.e. when physical capital is fixed, an exogenously driven increase in 
female participation tends to reduce aggregate wages. It is striking to notice that in countries 
where the labour force rose faster, such as the US, average wages have not progressed much 
or have even declined (See Card, Kramarz and Lemieux 1999). Gottschalk (1997) however 
shows that if male wages have declined over the period 1979-1994, wages and employment of 
women have progressed very significantly. This would suggest either that labour demand for 
women plays an important role or that societies accept more easily female employment due to 
changes in social norms and discrimination. In countries where the share of women in the 
labour force is low, such as Italy, France or Spain, aggregate wages have progressed faster 
over the last decades (Bertola 1999). One should also remark that in these countries, if female 
participation rates have been low compared to the US, the growth rates have been higher than 
in average in the OECD. In the short-run, growth rates matter since physical capital cannot 
adjust. One indeed finds evidence of a positive and significant impact of the growth rate of 
the female labour force on the unemployment rates of women and young workers (Wasmer 
2001b). 
 
 
6.2. Measuring experience in the labour market 
 
One way to measure the consequences of female participation is to focus on the supply 
of experience. Due to interruptions of labour market activity that are more frequent for 
women than for men, women necessarily accumulate less labour market experience as men. 
However, measures of labour market experience from individual surveys usually have low 
quality, since the exact number of years worked is typically not known. Experience is often 
approximated with the so-called potential experience, i.e. age minus education. If this proxy is 
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considered as a good instrument in the estimates of wage equations, the measurement error is 
rather large: O’Neill and Polacheck estimate that actual experience of women is about 2/3 of 
potential experience, with an increase in this fraction over time and cohorts. For this reason, 
we prefer to use aggregate data to approximate experience of men and women.  
The idea is as follows: let pat be the participation rate of a cohort of age a at time t. For 
simplicity, we ignore the gender dimension in the notation. At time t-1, the cohort had a 
participation rate of pa-1,t-1, and at the age of entry to the labour market, say 15, that cohort had 
a participation rate of p15,t-(a-15). It follows that the average experience of the cohort of age a at 
time t can be written: 
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where d<1 is a discount factor characterizing the yearly depreciation rate of the accumulated 
experience at rate 1-d. Since we use participation rates and not employment rates, this 
measure of experience is experience of the labour market, not of employment.32 Rewriting the 
above formula by changing the index and defining by e=a-a' the potential experience of the 
labour market, one obtains 
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This formula is equivalent to the usual formula defining the capital stock of a plant of 
age a, i.e. as the sum of depreciated past investments in physical capital. There is one 
difference though: the initial stock of experience is known as it is simply zero at the age of 15. 
The total stock of experience of men and of women is the sum across all cohorts, with 
weights the share of the cohorts in the male (resp. female) active population (denoted by Kta,a , 
with K=m,f for male and female). We thus obtain: 
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which also gives the average experience of labour market participants, with fta  the share of 
women in the labour force, as  
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32 This measure of experience is less accurate than employment experience as far as the issue is to 
measure human capital (although, young graduates usually learn a lot when looking for jobs). Labour market 
experience however captures better the idea of attachment to the labour market: unemployment spells then 
matter. There was not enough employment data per age and gender available to estimate employment 
experience. One can use this constraint to one’s advantage: as argued later on, labour market experience is a 
good instrument for employment experience in an unemployment model. 
  
 
50 
The OECD and the ILO provide participation data and population by gender and age 
intervals for several countries for the period 1960 to 1998. A logistic function of participation 
rates by age, gender and country are regressed on lagged values, a trend and its square. The 
series are then dynamically forecasted on the basis of each model to obtain retrospective data. 
Series of forecast errors are computed to provide confidence intervals. This method ignores 
the break due to the war period, with the implication that forecasts (in the present case, a more 
accurate word would be backcasts) of participation before 1945 have a systematic error. The 
weight of those years in the average experience across cohorts is however rather small 
between 1970 and 1998, which is the period considered hereafter. See Wasmer (2001a) for 
more details about this method. We set d to 1, i.e. do not consider human capital depreciation. 
Figures 6.1-6.4 illustrate the time series evolution of experience by gender in France, 
Germany (western Länder), Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, the US. and the United 
Kingdom. They establish the following facts: 
1. In all countries, the average experience level of men is between 18 and 20 
years, with a decline in the seventies as the size of the cohorts of new entrants in the labour 
market peaks 16 years after the baby-boom. 
2. The average experience of women differs much more across countries. In the 
early 70’s, it was about 5 years in the Netherlands, 6 years in Spain, 8 years in the UK, 10 
years in France, the US and Germany, and 12 or more in Sweden and Finland.  
3. There is a general trend towards gender convergence, although it is especially 
slow in Spain, Germany and the Netherlands. 
4. The level of average experience, being by definition a weighted combination 
of both series, is closer to male experience in low participation countries. In most countries, 
average experience declined in the late 70’s, especially in countries where female 
participation was low and grew fast. 
The low experience levels of women in the 70’s are explained both by low 
investments in the labour market from older cohorts of women and by the over-representation 
of young women in the female labour force. The latter is a pure cohort-effect, presumably a 
transitory one given gender convergence. This indicates that countries with historically low 
levels of female participation, which faced a large demographic impact of the baby-boom and 
a change in social norms for recent cohorts had to cope with a strong reduction in average 
experience in the first instance. Subsequently, in the late 80’s, these factors have reverse 
consequences: the population becomes older, and higher female participation is rewarded by 
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higher average experience levels. Both factors, the ageing and the higher propensity of 
women to participate to the labour market, contribute to a U-shape pattern of experience in 
the labour market. One can isolate formally the effect of female participation on this U-shape 
evolution: for ftE <
m
tE , an increase in female participation raises 
f
ta  and initially contributes 
to a decline in tE , while 
f
tE  is an increasing function of past values of 
f
ta  implying, with a 
lag, that both tE and 
f
tE will increase. 
 
 
6.3. Measuring crowding-out in the youth labour market 
 
A test of the substitutability between women and young workers in the labour market 
would be to examine the impact of lower experience on the unemployment rate of youths. To 
check this, we can estimate the following regression in the panel of eight countries above: 
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where i is the country, t is time. The business cycle is controlled for by the log of 
unemployment of men aged 45-54. One expects a negative sign of fi and f’i if the decline in 
experience raises unemployment. To see this, think first of a world with perfect wage 
adjustment to labour supply and imagine a production function with, as an input, experience 
of the labour market with decreasing returns to this input. A decrease in the supply of 
experience should raise returns to experience, i.e. weaken the relative position of youths in the 
labour market. If relative wages cannot adjust fully, the decline in experience results into 
higher youth unemployment. The coefficients fi indicate the percentage increase in the 
unemployment rate of the 25-34 year old group when there is an increase of one year in 
average experience. 
A lag of the dependent variable is added to control for autocorrelation of the residuals. 
One might argue that experience is an endogenous variable because during unemployment the 
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worker does not accumulate experience. This is not the case here, however, because our 
measure of experience is the sum of past participation rates, not of employment rates.33 
The results are given in Table 6.1. Column (I) shows that the unemployment rate of 
young men is reduced by a higher level of average experience (each additional year reducing 
the rate of unemployment by 4%). This suggests that young male workers compete with low 
experience workers. Since in all countries, women have lower experience than the average 
even in the 90’s, this is evidence of substitutability between young workers and women. 
Young female workers do not appear to be affected by overall experience as shown in column 
(II). This is a priori surprising since one would expect competition between young women 
and other low experience workers.  
To clarify this, columns (II) and (IV) re-estimate the model by separating experience 
for men and women. The drawback of this specification is that, implicitly, it is assumed that 
the supply of experience is not aggregate, but rather segmented: one market for men, and one 
market for women. The outcome is reassuring for men: there is a larger impact of female 
experience (-11% for each additional year), meaning that, the more experienced women are, 
the less competition with them occurs, while experience of men is not significant. For women, 
the result is slightly more difficult to appreciate: their unemployment rate is raised by 
experience accumulation of men (with a 9% semi-elasticity) and reduced by experience 
accumulation of women. One interpretation is that, as women’s experience increases, the 
cohorts of new female entrants to the labor market are perceived as having highe r labor 
market attachment and thus face a higher relative demand from employers. An alternative 
interpretation, less favourable to the econometric specification, is that the cycle indicator used 
(male log unemployment rate for the 45-54 year old group) is not capturing well the cyclical 
conditions for women’s labor demand. As a check, we replaced this indicator by the female 
counterpart and obtained insignificant results on the coefficients fi with or without breaking 
up experience by gender. Overall, the results of columns (I) and (II), consistently with Grant 
and Hamermesh (1982) cited above, suggest net-substitutability of young men with women, 
especially with low experience women, and no particular substitutability between young men 
and older men. 
                                                 
33 It might however be the case that current participation is reduced when unemployment is higher, but 
this would affect only current participation, not past participation rates. This implies that experience is only 
marginally affected by current unemployment and can thus be considered as exogenous. 
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Although the institutional factors are already controlled for by country fixed effects 
and country specific trends, it is of interest to interact the coefficient of experience with 
institutional variables or with country fixed effects. Table 6.2 shows the results. For male 
workers, youth unemployment is reduced by an increase in average experience of the labour 
market participants in countries with a high level of employment protection (see column II), 
as the interaction coefficient reveals. Interacting with country effects (column I) also shows a 
significant coefficient of experience for Sweden, Germany, France and somehow the 
Netherlands and the US, but Finland has the wrong sign. The fit of the model for female 
workers is less good (column III), although the interaction term between experience and 
employment protection remains negative and significant (column IV). Other regressions, 
specifying interaction terms between experience and benefit duration or with the replacement 
rate of unemployment benefits, did not exhibit significant interactions and are not reported. 
This is probably due to the fact that young workers are not frequently covered by 
unemployment insurance because of seniority rules. 
 
 
6.4. Conclusions  
 
In the US literature the consensus is that the rise in female participation rates has 
affected adversely the wages of unskilled workers, and youths in particular. In Europe, where 
wages at the lower end or the distribution are less flexible no such effect can be detected but 
there is an effect on youth unemployment rates. We suggested a new way of measuring mean 
labour market experience in the labour market, by making use of an inventory method 
conventionally used to measure the capital stock. We found that a rise in the mean labour-
market experience of women decreases the unemployment rates of both male and female 
young workers. To the extent that mean experience picks up the effects of female labour on 
youth unemployment, the negative impact is consistent with substitutability between youths 
and inexperienced women but complementarity between youths and experienced women.  
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7. What should policy do? 
 
 
Our main objective in this section is to return to the main policy issue that we began 
with, the European Union’s objectives of raising employment rates in the EU for women to at 
least 60 per cent by the year 2010 (the Lisbon target) and to achieving equality of 
employment opportunity and pay for women. Are these objectives realistic and how well have 
European Union countries been doing in their pursuit of those targets? 
Legislation aiming to end discrimination with regard to employment opportunities and 
wages pre-existed the Lisbon agenda. The European literature evaluating the success of such 
legislation is sparse but there is a rich literature on the effects of civil rights legislation on 
wage differentials in the United States. This legislation came into force mainly in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The first substantial legislation referring to women (again, in the 
United States) is the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which requires equal pay for substantially equal 
work among men and women (but it does not include any provision for hiring, layoffs or 
promotions). The Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination both in 
employment opportunities and in wages (including hiring, layoffs or promotions). In the same 
year the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was instituted to enforce Title 
VII. The 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act authorized the EEOC to initiate lawsuits 
on behalf of workers.34 Most of the US literature, surveyed for example by Blau and Kahn 
(1992) and Altonji and Blank (1999), focuses on differentials by race and finds that civil 
rights policies, aided blacks and women over the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, Be ller (1982) 
provides some indicative evidence that Title VII led to a reduction of the gender wage gap 
and of occupational segregation by sex in the US between 1967 and 1974.  
In Europe, there is a basic legislative framework relating to equal pay and equa l 
treatment in the workplace that is common across EU countries.  The principle of equal pay 
for men and women is contained in Article 119 of the EEC Treaty.  Since 1975 this basic 
principle has been developed through a series of directives. In particular, the Council 
Directive 76/207/EEC also adds the principle of equal treatment of men and women with 
regards to: access to employment, vocational training and promotions and working conditions 
                                                 
34 The first female discrimination case brought before the Supreme Court was “Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp” in 1971. Phillips, a white woman, was not hired because she had children at pre-school age, yet 
men in the same situation were hired (source EEOC, annual report 1972). The court ruled in her favour. Several 
similar cases were brought to the attention of the court by the mid 1980s. (Olivetti (2001)) 
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(that is, Equal Employment Opportunities). Each country is expected to determine the 
procedure by which these rights may be asserted. In extreme cases, national  matters may be 
referred to the Court of Justice of the European Community. 35 
Countries in the EU, however, may differ in terms of the degree of law enforcement 
and in terms of the timing of introduction of country-specific Equal Pay and Equal 
Employment Opportunity legislation. Although Equal Pay laws have been in place in most 
European countries since the 1970s, legislation on Equal Employment Opportunity was 
introduced as late as the mid 1980s in many countries including: Austria, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden. This legislation was introduced in 1978 
in Belgium, Denmark and Norway. The UK constitutes an exception. The Equal Pay Act was 
introduced in 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975 in response to national demands.   
As discussed by Rice (1999), European countries substantially differ in the degree of 
awareness of equality issues and in the level of litigations arising from equal opportunities 
legislation. In particular, the UK and Ireland rank high in this dimension, whereas France and 
Belgium rank very low. This may be due to historical differences in the reasons why equal 
opportunities legislation was introduced, in response to domestic pressure as in the UK, or 
because of pressure from the European Union? 36 
The explanations of the rise in female employment and the closing of the wage gap 
that we reviewed made no reference to legislation as a cause of these changes. Although there 
is no decisive evidence of such causal links in the literature, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Legislation has probably had an effect on women’s choice of education and career. Women 
choosing to embark on long-term educational and career paths at least know that the courts 
can protect them from discrimination that does not allow them to reap the full rewards. The 
fact that discrimination is less in more skilled occupations may also be indirect evidence that 
legislation has helped, because it is easier to identify discrimination in professional 
occupations than in low-level routine jobs. 
Legislation can also have a big impact on social norms, which as we have seen have 
been cited as reasons for the increased participation of women. The United Kingdom, where 
legislation was introduced early on, has had one of the fastest rises in female employment and 
wage rates. In contrast, two of the countries with large participation rates and most segregated 
                                                 
35 For a summary of the timing of the introduction of Equal Pay and Equal Employment Opportunity 
legislation across countries see Table 5.11 in the OECD, Employment Outlook (1988). 
36 Blau and Kahn (2000, 2003) briefly describe the differences in Equal Pay and Equal Employment 
Opportunity Legislation in Europe and in the US. 
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labour markets (Sweden and Finland) were among the last European countries to introduce 
equal employment opportunity legislation  (1984 and 1987 respectively).   
Returning now more explicitly to the Lisbon targets, we take first a closer look at the 
feasibility of the overall employment target. Table 2.1 and figure 2.3 show that several 
countries have achieved the quantitative target but some, the Mediterranean countries in 
particular, are a long way behind. However, women’s education levels have been improving 
and social norms have been changing in favour of more women entering the labour force. 
There is an independent momentum that pushes up the participation rate of women and even 
if there is no policy change, participation rates are likely to increase. We calculate roughly the 
likely rise in participation rates that might be expected by the year 2010 given current trends. 
The age-employment profile of women is characterized by a similar hump shape in all 
countries in our sample (see figures 7.1 and 7.2 for Sweden and Italy). The employment rates 
for women in their early twenties tend to be the lowest, but they increase substantially as 
women enter their early thirties. In most countries, the highest employment rate is observed 
for women in their early forties. Conversely, as women are close to the retirement age, the 
employment rate drops significantly. Looking at figures 7.1 and 7.2 it is clear that the main 
difference between these two extreme examples is not in the shape of the employment-age 
profile, but rather in the level of the employment rate within each age group. 
The age-employment profiles reported in figures 7.1 and 7.2 do not represent the 
average employment history of an average  Swedish or Italian woman, but are based on the 
actual employment rates of women  who entered the labour market at very different points in 
time. In other words, the employment rates refer to women of different cohorts. For example, 
women in the age group 55-60 were born in the early 1940s, while women in the age group 
30-35 were born in the early 1970s. Women belonging to the first group had very low 
employment rates throughout their working life, since in their cohorts female participation 
was generally low. The typical labour market history of a woman that is  in her prime-age in 
the early 2000s is rather different, and is much more labour intensive than that of the 
generation of her mother. 
In the year 2010, the oldest cohort of women in the working age population will be 
that of women born in the late 1940s, who entered the labour force in the late 1960s or early 
1970s, when participation rates were rising fast. In addition, the women in their 50s will be 
those women that in the early 2000s experienced the largest employment rates. One can argue 
that  the latter women will have employment rates much larger than the employment rates of 
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women that are currently in their 50s. Such cohort effects can be substantial, and can have 
sizeable effects at the macro level. 
Table 7.1 calculates the female employment rate of women in 2010, based on the 
cohort effects mentioned above. The estimates of the working age population by different age 
groups and gender are obtained from the ILO population estimates. The level of employment 
in 2010 for different age groups is obtained in the following way.  For women in the age 
groups 45-64, we assume that total employment in 2010 will be the same as the current total 
employment of those identical (albeit younger) women. For women in the age groups 15-45, 
we assume that the employment rate in 2010 will be as high as it is today. The results show 
that these cohort effects are substantial. For the case of Italy, the employment rate in the year 
2010 will be 49 per cent, up from a level of 41.3 per cent in 2001. For the Mediterranean 
countries as a whole, the exercise suggests that  cohort effects can result in an increase in the 
female employment rate by some 6-7 percentage points. Figure 7.3 shows in detail the shift in 
the age-employment profile in Italy that such effects may induce.  
Finally, in Table 7.1 we present also the estimate of the employment rate in the year 
2010, assuming that cohorts 14-45 will increase their employment rate by two percentage 
points. The aggregate effects of such exercise are less dramatic, for two reasons. First, 
employment rates of the  young workers are very low, and an increase of two percentage 
points has little macro impact. Second,  population aging shifts most of the working age 
population to the older class, and further reduces the marginal effect of the increase in the 
employment rate of the younger workers.  
So something like a third of the distance to the achievement of the Lisbon target will 
probably close even in the Mediterranean countries because of the internal dynamics of 
female employment rates now in place. These calculations, however, depend on women 
maintaining their high employment rates into middle age. This assumes that their accumulated 
pension rights do not give them incentives to retire early. Currently, the pensions system in 
some countries gives strong incentives for early retirement. In this event, the high 
employment rates computed will not be achieved. So succeeding to narrow the gap vis-à-vis 
the Lisbon targets requires also reform of the pensions system, at least in some countries, to 
remove strong incentives to retire early. 37Even if the internal dynamics narrow the Lisbon 
gap, there is still long distance to be travelled before the target is reached. And what about the 
                                                 
37 This is obviously even more relevant to the European Union objective of “active ageing” but it has 
implications for women’s employment too, given that older women will have to stay in employment if the 
female target is to be reached. 
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other objectives of the European employment strategy, equal employment opportunity and 
equal pay? 
Women entered jobs in the United States in big numbers partly because of 
technological and sectoral shifts and partly because of improvements in working conditions at 
home. The main shift in the market place that helped women is the one from manufacturing 
and agriculture to services, and the main innovation at home is the availability of durables and 
the possibility of family planning. European women have access to the same technologies and 
some countries, the Nordic and the United Kingdom in particular, have for all practical 
purposes achieved what the United States has achieved. Our examination of the data has 
revealed some things that can be done to help the other countries converge with the Anglo-
Saxon and Scandinavian countries. 
Primary among these appears to be market deregulation, notably in the market for 
final output. If the service sector is to create the jobs that will attract the women, 
entrepreneurship in the service sector has to be encouraged through easy access to company 
creation, an operation free of intervention from the state, and easy recruitment of workers. 
Product market regulation takes a variety of different forms and formal econometric work is 
only just beginning. But indications are that heavily regulated markets have adverse effects 
for women’s employment. We would include here high taxation for small enterprises, 
restrictions on the firing of employees which makes it very expensive for a small company to 
recruit workers, either full time or part-time, and high minimum wages and social security 
contributions. 
The creation of part-time and flexible temporary jobs should also be encouraged by 
policy. There is a European Union directive for the creation of more part-time jobs, as part of 
the overall Employment Strategy, and this is especially important for women. Although the 
evidence that countries that create more part-time jobs also create more overall employment is 
not very strong, there is some evidence pointing in this direction, and it becomes stringer and 
more convincing when countries at the extremes of the distribution are compared. The 
Mediterranean countries have not created many part-time jobs, almost certainly because their 
labour markets are too rigid to enable firms to create them. If they liberalise their markets to 
make it easier for firms to create such jobs their aggregate employment rates will almost 
certainly rise. 
A large number of the jobs that will be created in the service sector will be in small 
companies or will be for people working on their own account. Successful countries, like the  
United Kingdom, Denmark and the Netherlands, have low product-market regulation, give 
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incentives to new entrepreneurs and have opened large numbers of part-time jobs. Temporary 
jobs may be another source of employment for women, especially in countries where regular 
jobs are protected by strict legislation with vested interests that do not allow change. 
Although we found some evidence that women do not consider temporary jobs satisfactory, 
their existence may be a necessary second-best solution to a more serious problem, the 
existence of entrenched rigidities in the labour market. But we found no evidence against 
part-time jobs. The women who have them seem to have them because they want them. At 
least as a start of a labour market career for women with children, part-time jobs may offer a 
useful first step to other forms of employment. 
If the liberalisation reforms that we are suggesting (and most of which have been 
mentioned in several European Commission documents since Lisbon) are pursued, the 
employment of single women will almost certainly rise to the desired targets everywhere. But 
married women need the extra provision for family care. The European Union wants 
governments to provide state-subsidised care for 90 per cent of children in school-going age. 
Although the evidence is that the countries that currently provide for subsidised family care 
for working wives have higher employment rates of married women, providing such care by 
the state can be expensive and we see no overwhelming economic reason fo r such massive 
support. The same objectives can be achieved if private initiative is encouraged to set up 
small family-care units run by a small number of individuals each, themselves most likely 
women with children working on their own account. Encouragement of this kind can take the 
form of tax incentives and long-term low-interest start-up loans or grants. Support can also 
take the form of vouchers given to parents of small children by the state, although again there 
is no reason why the vouchers should do more than offer a small subsidy. Unsubsidised 
private initiative appears to be the driving force behind family care in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, two high-employment countries. But it should be noted that the 
participation rates of women with two or more children in these two countries is not as high 
as it is in the Nordic countries, where state family provision is common. 
What about employment equality? There is certainly evidence of some job segregation 
– women working in some sectors of the economy and men in others. Such segregation, 
however, is not necessarily a bad thing and might reflect either preferences or comparative 
advantage. We did not find strong evidence of discrimination in this respect. But women are 
also heavily represented in part-time and temporary jobs. Although as we pointed out we 
believe that the allocation to part-time jobs is voluntary, the over-representation in temporary 
jobs may not be. Legislation that is designed to ensure that men and women are given equal 
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opportunities in all types of jobs should be enforced with the same level of strictness 
everywhere. 
The same can be said about wages. There is evidence that although the gender wage 
gap has been narrowing, there is still wage discrimination against women, both in temporary 
jobs and in regular full-time jobs. European countries do not actually suffer as much from this 
as the United States does, but the reasons are unrelated to discrimination. In the United States 
there is more inequality in general and a larger gender wage gap is one of its symptoms. In 
Europe stronger unions and other institutions compress the wage structure and so move 
women’s pay closer to men’s. Unions have another effect on female employment rates. There 
is some evidence that they affect them adversely, both absolutely an in relation to men. 
Generally, the effect of unions is one that works against larger participation rates but in favour 
of those who are already in the market. 
At first sight the Mediterranean countries appear to be doing better in achieving wage 
equality between men and women. This is partly because of the higher overall wage 
compression effects of labour market institutions that we already discussed. But it is also due 
to another factor, the nature of female employment rates in southern Europe. The women 
participating in southern Europe are on average more skilled because not as many unskilled 
women as in northern Europe participate. The gender wage gap is smaller for higher skills and 
as their participation rates increase and more unskilled women come into the market, the 
average gap should increase. 
What can governments do to reduce the difference between men’s and women’s rates 
of pay? There is already legislation in place across the European Union making it an offence 
to pay different wages for similar types of work. Enforcement is not uniform and increasing 
monitoring should contribute to the narrowing of the gap. The closing of the gap, however, 
will come only if market developments are favourable to it. In this connection, as women 
pursue more stable careers and advance further up the occupational ladder the gap should be 
narrowing. This, for example, has been a major force behind the narrowing of the gap in the 
United States. Policy here can help through education and training and more directly through 
the provision of family care units and other incentives that reduce the interruptions of 
women’s careers. But when the incentives are given as longer mandatory parental leave, as is 
the case in most countries, the evidence we found is that the gap widens, probably because 
with the prospect of a larger interruption on full pay, employers offer lower wages to 
compensate. The cost of the non- interruption cannot be on the employer, otherwise it will 
have the perverse effect on the gender wage gap. 
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There are of course big advantages from the increased participation of women but 
some groups of the population will feel the pressure of increased competition for jobs. On 
average the capital stock should eventually adjust to compensate the median worker for any 
loss of earnings, but because women are not competing directly with the median some long-
term negative consequences for some groups might remain. We identified young workers, 
especially men, as the ones most vulnerable to competition from newly arriving women. 
Governments need to provide for these workers, because the cause of the deterioration of their 
prospects is itself a government- initiated change. We found that in Europe, where youth 
wages are not as flexible as in the United States, the entry of more women raises the 
unemployment of young workers. This is a critical time in a worker’s life and the loss of 
earnings, experience and the self-esteem that come with the first job can have long-term 
consequences for the young person’s employment prospects and welfare.  
For this reason welfare policies that deal with youth unemployment should be given 
priority by governments in countries that are facing fast rise in female employment rates. Tax 
incentives for firms to take on youths should accompany any similar measures designed to 
encourage the employment of women. But whereas women do not experience much long-
term unemployment, youths are an especially vulnerable group. Measures such as the ones 
implemented in the Nordic countries and the UK that target unemployed youths and give 
them active support to speed up their transition to work are especially effective in offsetting 
the adverse effects of job competition. These measures, however, should be temporary: 
crowding-out effects should disappear progressively as women accumulate more experience. 
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Figure 2.1 
Female inactivity and unemployment as per cent of population 
of working age, 2000 
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 Figure 2.2. Male and Female Employment Rate, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Male and Female Distance From Lisbon Target, 2000 
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 Figure 2.4. Female Employment Rate and Incidence of Female Part-Time Jobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Share of Part-Time Jobs and Employment Growth 
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Figure 3.1
Employment rate for women and average family day care spending per 
employed woman
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Figure 6.1 
 Experience of the labour force in the US and the UK. 
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 Figure 6.2 
Experience of the labour force in (West) Germany and Spain. 
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Figure 6.3. 
 Experience of the labour force in France and the Netherlands. 
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Figure 6.4. 
 Experience of the labour force in Finland and Sweden. 
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Figure 7.1 
Female Employment Rates by Different Age Groups: Sweden 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. 
Female Employment Rates by Different Age Groups: Italy 2001 
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Figure 7.3 
Age Employment Profile in 2001 and 2010 in Italy with Cohort Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
-
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70+
employment rate 2001
employment rate 2010
Table 2.1 
Female Employment Rates, 1960-2000 
Persons aged 15 to 64 years 
 
  1960 1980 2000 Men, 2000 
Lisbon 
distance 
(a) 
Nordic  40.5 64.3 70.3 78.6 10.3 
 Denmark 42.7 66.2 71.2 80.4 11.2 
 Finland 54.9 65.0 64.3 69.7 4.3 
 Norway 26.1 58.4 73.4 88.1 13.4 
 Sweden 38.1 67.6 72.1 76.2 12.1 
Anglo Saxon  43.1 54.5 65.2 79.3 5.2 
 United Kingdom 43.1 54.5 65.2 79.3 5.2 
Mediterranean   30.8 40.1 69.7 -19.9 
 Greece  30.7 40.4 70.2 -19.6 
 Italy 28.1 33.2 39.7 68.5 -20.3 
 Spain 21.0 28.4 40.3 70.3 -19.7 
Rest of Europe   41.0 56.6 74.4 -3.4 
 Austria  52.4 59.3 78.1 -0.7 
 Belgium 29.6 35.0 51.1 69.8 -8.9 
 France 42.9 50.0 53.1 68.1 -6.9 
 Germany 35.0 34.8 58.1 73.5 -1.9 
 Ireland  32.2 52.2 74.0 -7.8 
 Netherlands  35.7 62.1 81.1 2.1 
 Portugal  47.1 60.1 75.9 0.1 
North America   53.1 66.6 77.8  
 United States 39.5 53.9 68.0 80.4  
 Canada  52.3 65.1 75.2  
Average    58.6 75.2  
 
Notes 
(a) Lisbon distance is the percentage difference between the female employment rate in 
2000 and 60 per cent 
(b) source: OECD 2000 
 Table 2.2. Women and Part-Time Work 
 
Women Men Full-time work
Part-time 
work Total
Nordic 25.6 8.1 41.9 72.1 47.3
Denmark 23.9 8.6 42.4 71.2 46.9
Finland 13.5 6.6 45.7 64.9 47.6
Norway 42.5 9.7 35.7 79.1 46.7
Sweden 22.6 7.6 43.8 73.3 48.2
Anglo Saxon 40.2 7.6 34.6 81.3 44.9
United Kingdom 40.2 7.6 34.6 81.3 44.9
Mediterranean 16.3 3.6 34.2 72.4 37.4
Greece 9.2 2.9 36.4 66.5 38.0
Italy 23.4 5.5 32.3 71.3 37.0
Spain 16.4 2.5 33.8 79.5 37.3
Rest of Europe 34.5 6.6 34.7 81.0 43.2
Austria 24.3 2.3 37.9 89.2 44.1
Belgium 34.4 6.9 35.1 79.4 42.3
France 24.8 5.3 39.2 79.2 44.9
Germany 33.7 4.4 35.2 85.8 43.9
Ireland 32.9 7.5 33.6 75.6 41.2
Netherlands 57.1 13.0 27.1 76.8 42.9
Portugal 12.6 3.0 42.7 77.9 45.3
North America 23.2 8.6 42.1 70.0 46.4
United States (1999) 19.4 7.3 43.1 69.7 46.6
Canada 27.0 9.8 41.0 70.3 46.2
Average 29.2 6.9 39.2 80.4 45.8
Incidence of part-time Female shareb
 Table 2.3. Women Employment Rate and Employment Gender Gap by Educational 
Attainment 
Employment
 rate
Gender
gap a
Employment
 rate
Gender
gap a
Employment
 rate
Gender
 gap a
Nordic 80.3 6.5 66.7 11.6 87.1 5.4
Denmark 80.5 7.7 68.2 9.2 88.7 4.5
Finland 77.6 7.0 69.5 8.3 84.8 8.0
Norway 81.5 7.1 63.8 14.6 87.3 4.9
Sweden 81.7 4.1 65.4 14.5 87.8 4.3
Anglo-Saxon  73.1 14.4 49.7 17.3 86.4 8.0
United Kingdom 73.1 14.4 49.7 17.3 86.4 8.0
Mediterranean 51.3 34.9 38.7 45.8 77.0 13.2
Greece 52.6 35.9 42.1 45.5 78.4 12.4
Italy 50.7 33.9 35.8 46.8 78.7 12.4
Spain 50.6 34.8 38.1 45.1 74.0 14.8
Rest of Europe 68.5 19.6 54.2 26.6 85.6 8.8
Austria 73.5 16.2 61.6 17.6 86.5 9.2
Belgium 67.8 20.1 47.4 32.3 86.7 8.6
France 69.6 17.7 56.5 23.6 83.1 8.5
Germany 71.1 16.3 55.4 20.9 83.4 10.5
Ireland 53.1 29.0 33.7 39.5 79.9 13.3
Netherlands 70.9 21.4 53.4 32.8 86.6 8.8
Portugal 73.9 16.4 71.5 19.7 93.0 2.6
North America 74.1 13.3 50.9 23.7 80.9 10.4
United States (1999 74.1 14.8 49.7 26.5 81.9 11.6
Canada 74.0 11.8 52.0 20.8 79.8 9.2
Average 72.2 20.2 56.0 28.3 88.5 9.7
Persons aged 25 to 54 years
Total Less than upper secondary  University/tertiary
Table 2.4. Female Share in the Population by Educational Attainment 
 
 
 
25-34 35-54 55-64 Total 25-34 35-54 55-64 Total
Nordic 50.2 49.5 47.8 49.4 55.8 52.4 45.2 52.5
Denmark 51.4 47.9 41.8 47.8 55.4 53.1 38.3 51.7
Finland 50.8 50.6 51.1 50.7 59.5 53.9 47.6 54.6
Norway 49.8 48.8 47.5 48.9 55.2 48.9 43.8 50.4
Sweden 48.9 50.9 50.7 50.2 53.1 53.8 51.3 53.2
Anglo-Saxon 49.2 47.6 34.5 46.5 46.8 47.0 36.2 45.6
United Kingdom 49.2 47.6 34.5 46.5 46.8 47.0 36.2 45.6
Mediterranean 52.4 48.5 40.9 49.3 55.2 45.3 34.5 47.9
Greece 52.2 49.3 42.6 49.5 55.2 42.9 30.3 46.0
Italy 52.0 48.3 42.2 49.1 55.3 46.9 39.9 48.7
Spain 52.9 47.9 38.0 49.2 55.0 46.2 33.4 48.9
Rest of Europe 51.2 49.1 45.0 49.3 52.4 46.7 39.6 47.5
Austria 47.9 45.3 42.7 45.7 50.3 39.0 25.1 40.2
Belgium 51.4 50.4 46.7 50.3 53.7 50.4 43.3 50.7
France 50.2 48.0 44.3 48.3 54.0 50.8 46.5 51.6
Germany 48.4 47.1 43.6 46.7 45.8 39.1 29.3 38.7
Ireland 54.1 53.7 52.8 53.7 52.0 48.1 44.9 49.4
Netherlands 50.8 46.8 40.3 47.1 50.5 41.8 37.5 43.9
Portugal 55.7 52.8 44.6 53.5 60.5 57.6 50.6 58.1
North America 51.1 50.9 50.8 51.0 52.5 49.5 46.0 49.9
United States (19 51.5 51.2 52.1 51.4 53.4 50.0 45.0 50.3
Canada 50.6 50.7 49.6 50.5 51.6 49.1 47.1 49.6
Average 54.1 52.1 47.4 52.3 56.6 50.8 42.6 51.7
Percentage of women in the total population in each category
At least upper secondary education Tertiary education
 Table 2.5. Female Employment Rate By Presence of Children 
Employment
 rate
Gender
 gap a
Employment
 rate
Gender
gap a
Employment
 rate
Gender
gap a
Employment
 rate
Gender
gap a
Nordic 80.3 6.5 80.6 3.3 82.6 8.4 77.6 14.0
Denmark 80.5 7.7 78.5 7.7 88.1 3.5 77.2 12.9
Finland 77.6 7.0 79.2 0.1 78.5 11.8 73.5 19.7
Norway 81.5 7.1 82.9 5.9 83.3 .. 78.0 ..
Sweden 81.7 4.1 81.9 -0.4 80.6 9.8 81.8 9.4
Anglo-Saxon 73.1 14.4 79.9 5.4 72.9 17.1 62.3 28.2
United Kingdom 73.1 14.4 79.9 5.4 72.9 17.1 62.3 28.2
Mediterranean 51.3 34.9 53.5 27.8 51.2 42.0 45.3 48.0
Greece 52.6 35.9 53.1 31.1 53.9 40.3 50.3 45.4
Italy 50.7 33.9 52.8 26.2 52.1 40.9 42.4 49.9
Spain 50.6 34.8 54.6 26.0 47.6 44.7 43.3 48.6
Rest of Europe 68.5 19.6 72.3 12.5 70.2 22.3 60.6 31.6
Austria 73.5 16.2 76.0 10.5 75.6 18.5 65.7 29.0
Belgium 67.8 20.1 65.6 17.4 71.8 23.5 69.3 24.7
France 69.6 17.7 73.5 9.6 74.1 18.7 58.8 32.9
Germany 71.1 16.3 77.3 7.2 70.4 21.2 56.3 35.6
Ireland 53.1 29.0 65.8 14.1 51.0 33.2 40.8 43.2
Netherlands 70.9 21.4 75.3 15.6 69.9 24.3 63.3 30.8
Portugal 73.9 16.4 72.6 13.4 78.5 16.6 70.3 24.8
North America 74.1 13.3 77.5 6.6 75.3 16.1 66.5 26.3
United States (199 74.1 14.8 78.6 7.2 75.6 17.4 64.7 29.0
Canada 74.0 11.8 76.5 6.0 74.9 14.9 68.2 23.6
Average 51.7 19.6 53.5 14.4 51.8 23.5 49.1 27.1
Persons aged 25 to 54 years
Total No children One child Two or more children
Table 2.6. Part-Time Work by Gender and Presence of Children 
 
 
No children One child Two or more children Total No children With children Total
Nordic 16.3 18.0 23.3 18.8 5.1 3.4 4.2
Denmark 18.5 13.3 16.2 16.6 .. .. 3.7
Finland 7.5 8.6 13.6 9.2 .. .. 3.7
Norway 24.7 33.5 41.1 31.8 5.0 .. 5.0
Sweden 14.6 16.7 22.2 17.9 5.2 3.4 4.3
Anglo-Saxon 23.7 46.6 62.8 38.6 4.1 3.2 3.7
United Kingdom 23.7 46.6 62.8 38.6 4.1 3.2 3.7
Mediterranean 14.0 18.1 21.4 16.2 3.6 2.7 3.2
Greece 8.4 9.7 11.2 9.2 2.8 2.5 2.7
Italy 20.0 27.2 34.4 24.1 5.5 4.5 5.1
Spain 13.7 17.4 18.6 15.3 2.6 1.2 1.9
Rest of Europe 22.4 36.8 46.1 31.0 4.5 3.1 3.9
Austria 17.4 33.6 43.7 26.7 2.1 1.7 1.9
Belgium 29.2 34.7 46.1 34.7 6.5 5.1 5.9
France 20.0 23.7 31.8 23.7 5.2 3.6 4.4
Germany 24.0 45.3 60.2 35.2 4.2 2.3 3.4
Ireland 16.6 37.2 46.4 29.7 4.3 3.6 4.0
Netherlands 38.3 72.6 82.7 55.9 6.2 4.6 5.5
Portugal 11.5 10.5 11.3 11.2 2.7 1.3 2.0
North America 13.5 19.3 27.1 18.0 4.3 2.5 3.5
United States (1999) 10.1 15.8 23.6 14.6 3.5 1.8 2.7
Canada 17.0 22.9 30.7 21.4 5.2 3.2 4.3
Average 18.5 27.6 35.1 24.4 4.4 3.0 3.8
Percentage of persons working part time in total employment by category, workers aged 25 to 54 years
Women Men
 
Table 2.7. Employment Rate and Employment Growth, 1980, 2000 
 
 Employment Rate Employment Rate ∆(L/P) 3/ Empl. Growth 4/ ∆(WP) 5/ Lisbon Distance
1980-82 1/ 1998-20 2/
Nordic 74.36 73.05
Denmark 72.14 76.06 3.91 0.58 0.36 6.06
Finland 71.97 66.03 -5.94 0.04 0.34 -3.97
Norway 74.31 78.62 4.31 0.88 0.57 8.62
Sweden 79.02 71.49 -7.53 -0.10 0.35 1.49
Anglo Saxon 67.65 71.40
United Kingdom 67.65 71.40 3.75 0.52 0.37 1.40
Mediterranean 55.03 53.72
Greece 55.31 54.66 -0.65 0.80 0.76 -15.34
Italy 56.72 52.48 -4.24 0.00 0.39 -17.52
Spain 53.05 54.00 0.95 0.91 0.76 -16.00
Rest of Europe 62.02 65.03
Austria 75.79 73.48 -2.31 0.43 0.62 3.48
Belgium 56.90 58.06 1.16 0.25 0.19 -11.94
France 63.13 60.51 -2.61 0.39 0.60 -9.49
Germany 64.87 67.92 3.05 0.30 0.47 -2.08
Ireland 56.68 64.54 7.86 1.92 1.20 -5.46
Netherlands 53.96 63.26 9.31 1.47 0.71 -6.74
Portugal 62.81 67.45 4.64 0.87 0.48 -2.55
North America 66.26 72.75
United States (1999) 65.51 74.40 8.89 1.54 0.92
Canada 67.01 71.11 4.10 1.49 1.15
Average 64.5 66.2
1/Average 1980-20
2/ Average 1998-20
3/ Change in employment-working age population ratio (in percentage points). Average 1998–00 minus  average 1980–82.
4/ Average employment growth (in percent).
5/ Average growth of working-age population.
Table 2.8. Contribution to average employment growth between 1983 and 2000 by Age, 
Gender and Part-time/Full-time 
         
         
  Male  Female Total \1
  15-24 \2 25-49 \2 50-64 \2  15-24 \2 25-49 \2 50-64 \2   
Belgium         
    part-time 0.03 0.14 0.03  0.03 0.52 0.07 0.82
     full-time -0.18 -0.12 -0.28  -0.16 0.11 -0.02 -0.65
all contracts -0.15 0.02 -0.25  -0.13 0.63 0.05 0.17
Germany          
    part-time 0.03 0.07 0.04  0.03 0.30 0.07 0.53
     full-time -0.26 0.00 -0.21  -0.27 0.00 -0.01 -0.75
all contracts -0.23 0.07 -0.18  -0.24 0.29 0.06 -0.22
Denmark           
    part-time 0.07 0.05 0.01  0.14 -0.21 -0.01 0.05
     full-time -0.09 0.17 0.20  -0.11 0.43 0.27 0.88
all contracts -0.02 0.22 0.21  0.03 0.22 0.26 0.93
France           
    part-time 0.02 0.07 0.02  0.03 0.33 0.06 0.53
     full-time -0.17 0.18 -0.02  -0.16 0.20 0.05 0.09
all contracts -0.15 0.25 0.00  -0.13 0.53 0.12 0.62
Greece          
    part-time 0.00 -0.01 -0.01  -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 -0.18
     full-time -0.05 0.23 0.03  -0.03 0.56 0.10 0.84
all contracts -0.05 0.22 0.02  -0.04 0.43 0.09 0.65
Ireland           
    part-time 0.07 0.07 0.05  0.17 0.46 0.15 0.96
     full-time 0.01 0.75 0.15  -0.11 0.98 0.10 1.88
all contracts 0.08 0.82 0.20  0.06 1.44 0.25 2.84
Italy          
    part-time 0.00 0.06 0.00  0.01 0.18 0.01 0.26
     full-time -0.19 0.08 -0.14  -0.14 0.21 0.05 -0.13
all contracts -0.19 0.14 -0.14  -0.13 0.39 0.06 0.12
Netherlands           
    part-time 0.24 0.12 0.11  0.25 0.97 0.32 1.99
     full-time -0.18 0.43 0.28  -0.20 0.27 0.06 0.66
all contracts 0.06 0.55 0.39  0.05 1.24 0.38 2.66
Portugal          
    part-time 0.00 0.01 0.03  -0.01 0.11 0.12 0.26
     full-time -0.16 0.37 -0.08  -0.07 0.58 0.07 0.71
all contracts -0.16 0.38 -0.05  -0.08 0.69 0.19 0.98
United Kingdom         
    part-time 0.09 0.06 0.07  0.10 0.21 0.08 0.61
     full-time -0.20 0.38 -0.17  -0.18 0.46 0.10 0.39
all contracts -0.11 0.44 -0.11  -0.08 0.67 0.18 0.99
         
\1 Refers to total average employment growth by type of contract    
\2 Refers to different age groups       
 Source: Garibaldi-Mauro, 2002       
 
Table 3.1 
Institutional influences on female employment rates 
(common unobservable shocks, five-year averages, 1970-1995) 
 
Variable Estimates Fixed effects, % Common trend Institutional influence 
Const 0.48 (21.26) Austria 47.4 
1975/79 0.02 (1.82) Belgium 39.5 
1980/84 0.04 (3.59) Denmark 58.3 
1985/89 0.08 (6.20) Finland 61.7 
 
1990/95 0.10 (7.61) France 45.5 Union density 
Employment 
protection 
0.025 
(0.07) Germany 46.5 
Sample 
max -4.7% 
Union 
Density 
-1.07 
(1.35) Ireland 28.3 
Sample 
min +3.5% 
Union 
coordination 
0.11 
(0.52) Italy 34.2  
Replacement 
Ratio 
0.17 
(0.28) Netherlands 30.8 Start-up costs 
Benefit 
Duration 
-0.30 
(0.81) Norway 47.2 
Sample 
max -12.8% 
Tax 
Wedge 
1.06 
(0.80) Portugal 45.4 
Sample 
min +6.8% 
Start-up 
Costs 
-0.47 
(2.43) Spain 24.9 
Fixed 
Effects Yes Sweden 63.8 
Observations 89 UK 50.0 
R2 0.95 Canada 46.7 
  US 48.5 
1970/74 to 
1990/95 
 
+10.3% 
 
 
Notes: Estimated by non-linear least squares. The variables are all five-year averages, except 
for the last period, which has six years. The error terms may suffer from groupwise 
heteroskedasticity which might influence the efficiency of the estimates. All variables are 
entered as deviations form sample means. Additional countries included but not reported: 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland. The base values are the estimated constant plus 
the fixed effects. The common trend is the estimate of the time dummy for 1990/05, i.e., the 
estimated rise in employment for a country with all institutional variables at sample means. 
The effect of the two significant variables is reported for the country with the highest and 
lowest value in the sample in 1990/05. 
Table 3.2 
Institutional influences on female employment rates 
(observable country-specific shocks, five-year averages, 1970-1995) 
 
Variable Estimates Rise due to country-specific shocks, % 
Institutional influence, 
% 
Const 0.28 (32.42) Austria 5.9  
Labour 
Demand 
0.05 
(0.07) Belgium 7.5 Union density 
Interest 
Rate 
1.10 
(5.79) Denmark .04 
Sample 
Max -8.4 
TFP 
Gap 
1.02 
(0.42) Finland 4.0 
Sample 
min 6.4 
Terms of 
Trade 
-2.13 
(4.56) France 9.2  
Employment 
protection 
0.07 
(0.21) Germany 4.0 Replacement ratio 
Union 
Density 
-2.65 
(2.70) Ireland 9.3 
Sample 
Max -3.5 
Union 
coordination 
0.01 
(0.02) Italy 10.6 
Sample 
min 2.5 
Replacement 
Ratio 
-1.66 
(2.22) Netherlands 6.2  
Benefit 
Duration 
-0.67 
(2.04) Norway 10.3 Benefit duration 
Tax 
Wedge 
4.61 
(3.52) Portugal 8.2 
Sample 
Max -2.5 
Start-up 
Costs 
-0.69 
(3.41) Spain 8.0 
Sample 
min 2.1 
Fixed 
Effects Yes Sweden 5.7  
Observations 89 UK 4.8 Start-up costs 
R2 0.94 Canada 5.9 Sample Max -13.6 
  US 4.0 Sample min 7.3 
 
Notes: Estimation by non-linear least squares. The variables are all five-year averages, except 
for the last period, which has six years. The error terms may suffer from groupwise 
heteroskedasticity which might influence the efficiency of the estimates. All variables are 
entered as deviations from sample means. Additional countries included but not reported: 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland. The effect of the institutions is reported for the 
country with the highest and lowest value in the sample in 1990/05. 
 Table 4.1  
Summary statistics on male and female employment 
 
  UK SWE FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRE 
Males                
Part-time 3.3 3.6 3.8 2.8 1.7 4.8 2.6 1.7 2.1 7.6 4.3 4.5 2.6 1.4 6.0 
Involuntary part-time | P-T 24.6 n.a. 29.1 20.5 9.9 13.5 41.9 31.6 18.5 66.0 48.5 26.9 44.6 35.5 43.8 
On temporary job 7.4 6.0 12.9 12.2 8.3 8.2 7.8 4.6 7.9 13.5 8.7 12.0 34.9 19.6 22.0 
Hourly earnings 
Full-time/Part-time 
Permanent/Temporary 
 
113.8 
136.4 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
 
105.9 
139.7 
 
128.3 
127.6 
 
94.2 
125.7 
 
115.5 
158.9 
 
82.8 
129.3 
 
97.2 
141.5  
 
69.1 
119.4 
 
81.8 
15.3 
 
66.3 
147.7 
 
64.1 
134.3 
 
101.5 
177.3 
 
48.7 
143.9 
 
61.3 
146.7 
Females                
Part-time 30.2 17.8 9.5 17.0 22.8 45.2 26.9 21.2 24.6 29.2 21.6 21.8 15.4 8.7 15.9 
Involuntary part-time | P-T 7.3 n.a. 32.5 15.6 5.7 7.8 19.3 8.2 9.8 18.4 41.1 21.1 36.0 37.5 43.6 
On temporary job 9.6 7.5 18.2 11.9 9.8 14.3 13.7 7.4 10.3 22.7 10.5 14.6 40.7 22.3 23.9 
Hourly earnings 
Full-time/Part-time 
Permanent/Temporary 
 
130.0 
120.4 
 
n.a. 
n.a. 
 
105.1 
124.1 
 
103.2 
118.7 
 
91.6 
121.0 
 
105.4 
143.0 
 
98.1 
115.5 
 
105.3 
149.7 
 
91.3 
12.3 
 
90.07 
139.2 
 
85.1 
151.5 
 
67.8 
134.3 
 
115.8 
168.3 
 
63.6 
155.8 
 
56.7 
143.7 
                
Notes. All figures reported are in %. Definition of variables: part-time: normally working less than 30 hours in their main job; involuntary part-time: whose main reason for working part-time 
is that they wanted but they could not find a full-time job; on temporary contract: holding a fixed-term contract or no contract at all; hourly earnings: monthly wage or salary earnings divided 
by the number of monthly hours worked. The information on reason for part-time work and wages is not available for Sweden. Source: ECHPS. 
Table 4.2  
Female versus male employment characteristics: Probit estimates  
  UK SWE FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRE 
Part-time 
Single F, no kids  .053** .075** .019 .038** .001 .039** .112* .008 .057** .084** .084** .094** .050** .033** .015 
Married F, no kids .118** .116** .030* .089** .064** .178** .154** .048** .110** .144** .116** .125** .061** .030** .034** 
Single F, with kids .128** .105** .011 .048** .042** .175** .142** .027* .087** .113** .109** .094** .052** .027** .028** 
Married F, with kids .189** .138** .036** .096** .104** .301** .190** .077** .141** .187** .140** .138** .062** .031** .040** 
Married M, no kids -.022** -.036** -.021** -.021* -.025** -.030** -.042** -.039** .002 -.047** -.028** -.019** -.025** -.013** -.022** 
Single M, with kids .002 -.034** -.022** -.007 .019** .048** .013 -.009 -.027** -.010 .019** .011 .003 -.001 .004 
Married M, with kids -.019** -.041** -.027** -.019** -.027** -.024** -.035** -.038** .001 -.035** -.025** -.012* -.025** -.016** -.018** 
No. observations 35807 8125 8608 12709 12592 23463 11677 7732 14830 16134 26698 29934 27024 24536 15143 
Involuntary part-time | part-time 
Single F, no kids  .073** - -.202 .060 .064 .029 -.029 - .035 -.098 .415** .139** .121* .161 .141 
Married F, no kids .009 - -.107 -.046 .004 -.054** -.205* - -.029 -.231** .291** -.005 -.067 .113 -.030 
Single F, with kids .011 - -.100 .010 -.040 -.006 -.114 - -.040 -.193** .372** .063 .071 .140 -.054 
Married F, with kids -.032 - -.144 -.117 -.046 -.089** -.249** - -.081 -.318** .143 -.040 -.117 .106 -.177 
Married M, no kids -.017 - .276** -.065 -.064 -.053** .058 - -.093* .115* -.360** .018 -.061 .180 .044 
Single M, with kids .011 - .074 .139** -.125* -.035 -.052 - .090 .024 .078* -.019 .042 -.053 -.334** 
Married M, with kids .026 - .219** -.062 -.040 -.056** .068 - -.125** .088 -.156** -.021 -.023 .233** -.116 
No. observations 2451 - 544 1161 1477 4846 1377 208 1493 2017 2372 1979 1740 948 842 
On fixed-term contract 
Single F, no kids  -.007 .036** .043 .032 -.000 .006 .032 .004 .003 .053** .010 .042** .038* .038** .017 
Married F, no kids -.031** .007 .006 .006 -.013 -.023** .010 .004 -.020 .041* -.014 .009 -.20 .003 -.010 
Single F, with kids .003 .031* .022 .017 .013 .018 .009 .016 .011 .050** .011 .039** .028 .049** .046 
Married F, with kids -.014 .014 .010 -.007 -.012 -.003 -.001 .013 -.008 .038* -.011 .008 -.040 -.010 -.027 
Married M, no kids -.017** -.036** -.039** -.030** -.001 -.046** -.040** -.021** -.003 -.046** -.048** -.031** -.133** -.075** -.068** 
Single M, with kids .006 -.014** .007 -.007 .000 -.026** -.050** -.010 .019** -.009 .002 .022** .031** .030** .004 
Married M, with kids -.022** -.041** -.024* -.035** -.011 -.049** -.043** -.022** -.007 -.053** -.044** -.037** -.125** -.074** -.061 
No. observations 26979 8231 8496 9268 7891 19496 8988 6675 14164 11959 22478 24251 21705 20803 12145 
 
Notes. The figures reported are marginal effects obtained from probit regressions. Significance at 5% and 10% is denoted by ** and * respectively. The estimated equations also include: 4 age 
dummies (interacted with gender), 2 education dummies (interacted with gender), 9 occupation dummies, 2 sector dummies, 3 dummies for unemployment spells (if any) before the current job 
(unemployed for less than 6 months, for 6-12 months, or for more than 12 months), year dummies. Exception: for Sweden: no occupation or previous unemployment dummies are included, as the 
relevant information is not available in the data source. Source: ECHPS.  
Table 4.3:  
Job satisfaction on part-time and temporary contracts 
 
  UK FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRE 
(1) Overall job satisfaction  
Part-time 
 
.184** -.170* .216* -.092 -.061 -.143 .439 -.056 -.122* .022 -.111** -.163** -.161* -.205** 
Part-time * 
female 
.01 .028 -.113 .107 .117** .207** -.432 .148* .044 -.054 .006 .059 -.231** .139** 
On temporary 
contract 
-.200** -.012 -.140** -.215** -.119** -.095* -.077 -.216** -.293** -.097** -.447** -.254** -.349** -.716** 
On temporary 
contract * female 
.023 .082 .193** .07 .048 .114 .01 .009 .134** .009 .077* .018 .004 .04 
No observations 23969 7819 9089 7561 19491 8727 1725 14093 10013 20780 23785 21206 20621 12030 
(2) Satisfaction with earnings 
Part-time -.038 -.140 .233** -.060 -.062 .019 -.559 .024 -.007 -.131** -.354** -.367** -.415** -.382** 
Part-time * 
female 
.219** -.029 -.006 .054 .089* .035 .573 .013 -.060 .093* .147** .248** .000 .132* 
On temporary 
contract 
-.299** -.171** -.232** -.205** -.200** -.147** -.009 -.106** -.146** .015 -.331** -.210** -.119** -.448** 
On temporary 
contract * female 
-.006 .061 .200** .180** .079 .091 .015 -.067 .096* -.154** .083** .060* -.046 .036 
No observations 16251 7818 9172 7559 19448 8785 1725 14077 10007 20796 23781 21248 20614 12037 
(3) Satisfaction with type of  job 
Part-time .019 -.125 .271** -.070 -.133** -.011 .064 -.006 -.097 .037 -.006 -.049 .065 .077 
Part-time * 
female 
.005 -.054 -.184 .004 .052 .067 .004 .052 -.015 -.031 .017 -.039 -.343** .040 
On temporary 
contract 
-.171** -.033 -.123** -.112** -.122** -.035 .017 -.156** -.314** .000 -.348** -.191** -.245** -.589** 
On temporary 
contract * female 
.022 .015 .169** .061 .009 .121 .184 -.024 .091 .032 .076* -.064** .006 .149** 
No observations 26309 7812 9171 7548 19486 8774 1721 14075 9992 20800 23777 21252 20617 12037 
 
Notes. The figures reported are the coefficients obtained from ordered probit regressions. Significance at 5% and 10% is denoted by ** and * respectively. The estimated equations also 
include: a gender dummy, 4 age dummies, 2 education dummies, one dummy for married (interacted with gender), the number of dependent children (interacted with gender), 9 
occupation dummies, 2 industry dummies and year dummies. Sweden is excluded from the sample as no job satisfaction indexes are available. Source: ECHPS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 (continued):  
Job satisfaction on part-time and temporary contracts 
 
  UK FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRE 
(4) Satisfaction with working hours  
Part-time 
 
.063 -.291** -.02 .023 .074 .097 -.144 .406** -.099 .153** .178** -.097* -.184** .323** 
Part-time * 
female 
.382** -.038 .500** .303** .220** .291** .553 -.122 .348** -.016 .072 .157** -.109 .129* 
On temporary 
contract 
-.023 .037 -.033 -.146** .009 .004 .127 -.127** -.212** .022 -.336** -.193** -.100** -.538** 
On temporary 
contract * female 
-.085* -.106 -.149** .152** -.133** .009 -.083 -.099 -.079 -.155** .056 -.034 -.006 .082* 
No observations 26310 7818 9163 7550 19486 8767 1721 14075 9968 20800 23741 21238 20617 12037 
(5) Satisfaction with job security 
Part-time .165** -.102 -.064 -.049 -.095** -.019 -.141 -.057 -.075 -.038 -.171** -.303** -.251** -.125** 
Part-time * 
female 
-.045 .063 .025 .201 .053 .036 .242 -.015 -.023 -.009 .032 .228** .083 .179** 
On temporary 
contract 
-.829** -1.011** -.974** -.519** -1.065** -.723** -.809** -.530** -1.188** -1.097** -1.122** -1.206** -.932** -1.339** 
On temporary 
contract * female 
-.062 -.325** -.264** -.190** -.114** -.072 .373* -.326** -.167** -.374** .066 -.097** -.138** -.105** 
No observations 26183 7806 9166 7558 19440 8775 1724 14078 9991 20788 23782 21253 20613 12037 
 
Notes. The figures reported are the coefficients obtained from ordered probit regressions. Significance at 5% and 10% is denoted by ** and * respectively. The estimated equations also 
include: a gender dummy, 4 age dummies, 2 education dummies, one dummy for married (interacted with gender), the number of dependent children (interacted with gender), 9 
occupation dummies, 2 industry dummies and year dummies. Sweden is excluded from the sample as no job satisfaction indexes are available. Source: ECHPS.  
Table 4.4:  
Wages on non-standard contracts, OLS estimates 
                UK FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRC 
               Males 
 
log(hours) .682** .645** .615** .545** .580** .376** .419** .551** .480** .290** .442** .258** .306** .544** 
 
 
(.019) (.041) (.034) (.051) (.031) (.038) (.148) (.036) (.036) (.050) (.026) (.022) (.029) (.033) 
Part-time -.258** -.252** -.190** -.190** -.303** -.125** -.709** -.050 -.245** -.229** -.103** -.367** -.230** -.043 
 (.026) (.043) (.037) (.070) (.030) (.043) (.193) (.041) (.037) (.055) (.025) (.026) (.037) (.033) 
On temp contract -.168** -.169** -.116** -.121** -.194** -.109** -.147** -.112** -.112** -.195** -.128** -.173** -.059** -.116** 
 (.014) (.016) (.013) (.023) (.015) (.018) (.059) (.017) (.015) (.024) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.011) 
No. Observations 10761 2759 3196 2281 7331 2503 508 4967 4334 2210 7624 8945 7803 4571 
hourly part-time 
penalty 
-.038* -.006 .077** .125** -.012 .308** -.306** .261** .115** .263** .283** .147** .251** .273** 
Females 
 
log(hours) .831** .628** .718** .709** .884** .615** .800** .735** .812** .285** .538** .423** .454** .572** 
 (.019) (.035) (.037) (.074) (.029) (.044) (.113) (.043) (.041) (.045) (.032) (.030) (.032) (.039) 
Part-time -.158** -.185** -.132** -.035 -.042** -.161** -.05 -.039 -.080** -.316** -.076** -.245** -.171** .025 
 (.015) (.029) (.023) (.049) (.019) (.029) (.083) (.030) (.029) (.037) (.022) (.023) (.027) (.029) 
On temp contract -.099** -.138** -.058** -.136** -.238** -.026 -.141** -.106** -.157** -.175** -.107** -.201** -.093** -.165** 
 (.013) (.013) (.014) (.027) (.013) (.017) (.048) (.019) (.013) (.024) (.010) (.010) (.009) (.013) 
No. Observations 10283 2741 2472 1614 5752 2183 405 4144 3802 1633 5318 5315 5902 3238 
Hourly part-time 
penalty 
-.041** .073** .063** .166** .039** .106** .088** .145** .050** .180** .244** .155** .207** .321** 
 
Notes. The figures reported are the coefficients obtained from wage regressions. Dependent variable: (log) gross monthly earnings. Estimation method: OLS. Standard errors reported in brackets. 
Significance at 5% and 10% is denoted by ** and * respectively. The estimated equations also include: 2 education dummies, potential experience and its square, one dummy for married 
(interacted with gender), the number of dependent children (interacted with gender),  one dummy for previously unemployed, 5 dummies for employer size, one dummy for public sector, 9 
occupation dummies, 13 industry dummies and year dummies. Sweden is excluded from the sample as no information on earnings is available. Source: ECHPS 
Table 4.5:  
Wages on non-standard contracts, IV estimates 
               
 UK FIN DEN GER NET BEL LUX AUT IRE FRA ITA SPA POR GRC 
               Males 
 
log(hours) .888** .878** .902** .715** .745** .551** .887** .976** .362** .737** .581** .215** .283** .916** 
 
 
(.036) (.119) (.073) (.091) (.052) (.065) (.400) (.084) (.082) (.112) (.066) (.063) (.059) (.104) 
Part-time -.338** -.521** -.188* -.331** -.338** -.145 -.326 .218** -.617** -.458** -.099 -.661** -.539** .222* 
 (.069) (.181) (.105) (.115) (.057) (.094) (.619) (.104) (.105) (.131) (.062) (.086) (.081) (.128) 
On temp contract -.108** -.113** -.076** -.119** -.149** -.104** -.128** -.111** -.049** -.138** -.123** -.144** -.048** -.125** 
 (.018) (.026) (.015) (.025) (.017) (.021) (.065) (.019) (.019) (.032) (.010) (.009) (.010) (.013) 
No. Observations 9410 1376 2865 2111 6474 2158 484 3566 3609 1804 6596 7340 6650 3889 
Hourly part-time 
penalty 
-.260** -.436 -.120 -.133 -.161** .166** -.247 .234** -.175** -.276** .191** -.117* -.042 .280** 
Females 
 
log(hours) 1.030** .641** .787** .798** 1.129** .947** 1.270** 1.037** .791** .28 .719** .430** .396** 1.007** 
 (.048) (.152) (.093) (.172) (.058) (.113) (.229) (.102) (.126) (.176) (.091) (.090) (.079) (.182) 
Part-time -.138** -.241* -.159** -.059 .005 -.021 .191 .084 -.192** -.527** -.014 -.358** -.274** .242 
 (.037) (.129) (.055) (.116) (.040) (.080) (.169) (.067) (.088) (.129) (.065) (.072) (.065) (.159) 
On temp contract -.069** -.108** -.031* -.089** -.193** -.011 -.221** -.068** -.149** -.126** -.122** -.176** -.086** -.140** 
 -.015) (.020) (.016) (.032) (.014) (.019) (.057) (.022) (.016) (.031) (.012) (.011) (.011) (.016) 
No. Observations 8842 1303 2142 1369 4809 1824 366 2873 3002 1294 4486 4041 4805 2626 
Hourly part-time 
penalty 
-.159** .008 -.012 .081** -.084** .016 .004 .058** -.048* -.028 .181** .038 .145** .238** 
 
Notes. The figures reported are the coefficients obtained from wage regressions. Dependent variable: (log) gross monthly earnings. Estimation method: IV (hours worked and part-time status 
instrumented by their lagged values). Standard errors reported in brackets. Significance at 5% and 10% is denoted by ** and * respectively. The estimated equations also include: 2 education 
dummies, potential experience and its square, one dummy for married (interacted with gender), the number of dependent children (interacted with gender),  one dummy for previously unemployed, 
5 dummies for employer size, one dummy for public sector, 9 occupation dummies, 13 industry dummies and year dummies. Sweden is excluded from the sample as no information on earnings is 
avaliable. Source: ECHPS 
Table 5.1: Gender wage ratio in 1998
Hourly earnings Hourly earnings
full-time wage & all wage &
salary workers salary workers
Mediterranean
Spain 93 88
Italy 91 93
Greece 80 82
Nordic
Sweden 90 88
Finland 87 87
Denmark 93 92
Anglosaxon
UK 85 79
Rest of Europe
Austria 80 79
Belgium 94 93
France 93 93
Germany 83 83
Ireland 81 76
Netherlands 86 87
Portugal 85 85
Non-European Countries
Canada 81 78
USA 79 76
Notes: Ratio of median female to male hourly earnings. 
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, 2002
Table 5.2: The gender wage ratio by age (median hourly and monthly wages), 1998
25-34 35-44 45-54
hourly monthly hourly monthly hourly monthly
Mediterranean
Spain 94.76 85.85 95.07 87.94 82.77 76.33
Italy 98.54 90.98 97.31 87.12 92.40 85.19
Greece 100.00 90.91 88.33 86.67 79.65 70.86
Nordic
Finland 91.13 80.00 81.98 73.83 76.00 72.00
Denmark 91.80 82.56 92.50 79.55 90.48 80.36
Anglosaxon
UK 92.07 75.47 70.49 51.93 67.13 52.87
Rest of Europe
Austria 84.12 73.71 84.78 68.00 72.61 59.23
Belgium 96.11 86.57 96.13 78.13 88.09 73.64
France 95.15 86.72 86.03 75.91 86.11 75.00
Germany 85.92 78.00 82.90 68.18 80.59 66.22
Ireland 91.07 78.06 79.49 61.79 71.29 50.70
Netherlands 98.63 77.08 84.58 55.34 76.93 49.56
Portugal 86.79 83.26 83.88 77.27 81.56 77.85
Non-European Countries
USA 83.33 75.11 74.67 63.54 70.36 64.86
Source: Author's calculations based  on ECHP data for European countries and on CPS, Demographic 
File for the USA. The gap is computed as the percentage ratio of female to male wages. The sample is 
restricted to those who work 15+ hours per week, and excludes individuals working as apprentices and 
students.
Table 5.3: Evolution of the Gender Wage Ratio
Change 1998
1985 1998 to 1985 (%)
Mediterranean
Italy 0.813 0.829 1.61
Nordic
Sweden 0.832 0.810 -2.26
Finland 0.775 0.776 0.13
Anglosaxon
UK 0.665 0.734 6.95
Rest of Europe
France 0.838 0.897 5.86
Germany 0.710 0.769 5.89
Netherlands 0.744 0.769 2.56
Non-European Countries
Canada 0.652 0.711 5.80
USA 0.680 0.754 7.40
Note: Authors' calculation using available data from OECD, Labor Force Statistics.
Female/Male Median Earnings Ratio for Full-time, Year-round workers
Table 5.4: Decomposition of cross-country differences in the gender wage gap
Hourly wage Hourly gap Wage 
gap adjusted Structure
Mediterranean
Spain -4.1 -4.7 0.6
Italy -8.5 -5.7 -2.8
Greece -1.3 0.1 2.4
Nordic
Finland 2.8 1.8 0.9
Denmark -2.3 -0.8 -1.6
Anglosaxon
UK 6.5 2.3 4.2
Rest of Europe
Austria 7 8.5 -1.5
Belgium -4.1 -3.6 -0.4
France 3.9 3.4 0.5
Germany 4.3 3.6 0.7
Ireland 2 0.1 1.9
Netherlands 3.9 9.3 -5.4
Portugal -3.8 2.7 -6.5
Source: Table 2.B.2, OECD: Employment Outlook 2002, ch.2
Entries in the table represent percentage point differences from the gender wage gap
in the benchmark economy that are explained by each component.
The hourly wage gap represents the sum of the contributions due to cross-country 
differences in the gender gap in observed and unobserved characteristics. 
The wage structure represents the sum of the contributions due to cross-country 
differences in market prices for observed and unobserved characteristics 
Table 5.5: Estimated gender wage gap, the importance of sample selection
"Raw" estimates "Corrected" estimates
Mediterranean
Spain 14.14967 31.2943
Italy 8.50489 15.93678
Greece 11.7506 31.62456
Nordic
Finland 16.77544 9.596542
Denmark 11.41786 7.961227
Anglosaxon
UK 24.53988 26.12456
Rest of Europe
Austria 21.67339 15.23666
Belgium 9.444664 7.464218
France 12.37045 7.922073
Germany 19.76378 14.14988
Ireland 16.21227 25.1804
Netherlands 18.02296 18.67802
Portugal 10.02388 9.476135
Note: The estimated gender wage gap is computed as the difference of the male and female average 
log hourly earnings obtained by estimating gender specific equations where the dependent variable
is the logarithm of gross hourly wages. Indepent variables include education (two dummies), potential 
experience, and potential experience squared, occupation (fifteen dummies), tenure (four dummies)
public/private sector, type of contract, full time/part time, and interaction terms between part  
time, full time and weekly hours worked.
We exclude individuals working as apprentices and students as well as self-employed. The estimates 
corrected for sample selections are based on the Heckman's two-step consistent estimator. 
The participation equation includes age, marital status, education (two dummies), and weekly hours 
spent in child care.
Source: ECHP, 1998
Table 5.6:  Cross-sectional regression, ECHP 1998
Dependent variable: Estimated gender wage gap
All 25-34 35-44 45-54
Parental Leave .026 (.025) .025* (.009) .006 (.023) .006 (.008) .071** (.022) .0712 (.03) .028 (.035) .027 (.018)
Barg. Coverage .038 (.032) -.022 (.060) .294** (.078) .248** (.078) -.293* (.122) -.276 (.196) .018 (.063) -.055 (.123)
Max Rep. Rate -.212* (.079) -.113 (.088) -.33** (.058) -.25** (.048) -.153 (.158) -.182 (.302) -.254 (.113) -.132 (.148)
EEO lag .181 (.282) -.623 (.38) .977* (.398) .366 (.309) -.442 (.564) -.212 (1.4) .260 (.450) -.725 (.644)
EPL - regular 1.43 (1.307) 0.09 (1.04) 7.17*** (.864)6.15*** (.47) -1.82 (2.41) -1.44 (3.80) 1.60 (1.77) -.045 (1.47)
EPL - temporary -2.6*** (.42) .174 (1.17) -4.1** (.73) -2.0* (.673) -1.73 (1.07) -2.52 (4.1.7) -3.80** (.715) -.415 (1.87)
Product Market -9.85 (4.08) -7.49* (2.43) 2.81 (14.4) -12.-73 (6.56)
R-squared 0.88 0.9 0.89 0.9 0.84 0.844 0.88 0.95
Number of obs 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Note: The estimated gender wage gap is computed as the difference of the male and female average log hourly earnings 
obtained by estimating gender specific equations where the dependent variable is the logarithm of gross hourly wages. Indepent variables 
include education (two dummies), potential experience, and potential experience squared, occupation (fifteen dummies), tenure (four dummies)
public/private sector, type of contract, full time/part time, and interaction terms between part time, full time and weekly hours worked. 
We exclude individuals working as apprentices and students.
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Sources for Institutions: The index of Bargaining Coverage is from Blanchflower (1996). Parental Leave (weeks), EPL, and Union Density are 
from Nickel and Layard (1999). The Equal Employment Opportunity indicator is based on Table 5.1, OECD, Employment Outlook 1988. It
measures the time lag since the equal employment opportunity legislation was passed in each country.
The index of Product Market Regulation, and of EPL for temporary and regular contracts are from Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (1999);
The  maximum UI Replacement Rates are taken from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). The Segregation Index is from Anker (1998), Table 9.1.
Table 5.7:  Cross-section, time series regression results 
Dependent variable: Gender wage gap
 ( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )
Barg. Coverage -.025*** (.007) -.0148** (.0061) -.025** (.007) -.016* (.007) -.008 (.017) -.002 (.025)
Parental Leave  .0073** (.0028) .0014 (.0032) .0068** (.002) .003 (.004) .005 (.005) -.001 (.007)
EPL .0149 (.017) .0270 (.0302) .032  (.029) .033 (.035) -.010 (.042) -.034 (.045)
Union Density .0099* (.005) .0104* (.0052) .009 (.006) .009 (.006) .009 (.012) .011 (.012)
Max Rep. Rate -.0052 (.0035) .0037 (.0128) -.004 (.003) .005 (.015) .0015 (.01) .001 (.018)
EEO lag -.0056 (.063) .0587 (.0540) .018 (.059) .041 (.069) -.033 (.133) -.008 (.15)
Product Market -.419 (.413) -.298 (.524)
Sex Segregation -.014 (.050) -.045 (.153)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared 0.745 0.159 0.777 0.2945 0.695 0.15
Number of obs 40 40 40 40 31 31
Note: The coefficients in the table represent the marginal effect of each institution on the gender wage gap growth between 1980 and 1998.
The gender wage gap is computed as the log of the male/female wage ratio, median earnings for full time - full year workers 
for the periods 1980, 1990 and 1998. Sources: 1980 and 1990: Blau and Kahn (2000), data for Denmark, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain refer to 1994, Source: ECHP. Data for 1998 are from OECD, Employment Outlook (2002)
*** Significance at the 1% level, ** Significance at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA
Sources for Institutions: The index of Bargaining Coverage is from Blanchflower (1996). Parental Leave (weeks), EPL, and Union Density are 
from Nickel and Layard (1999). The Equal Employment Opportunity indicator is based on Table 5.1, OECD, Employment Outlook 1988. It
measures the time lag since the equal employment opportunity legislation was passed in each country.
The index of Product Market Regulation, and of EPL for temporary and regular contracts are from Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud (1999);
The  maximum UI Replacement Rates are taken from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). The Segregation Index is from Anker (1998), Table 9.1.
Table 6.1 
Youth unemployment and female experience 
Dependent variable  )log( ,3425,
m
tiu
−    )log( ,3425,
f
tiu
−   
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
 
tiE ,    -0.04** -  -0.01     - 
   (2.5)    (0.65)   
 
M
tiE ,       -  0.04    -   0.09*  
     (1.3)    (2.5) 
 
F
tiE ,       -  -0.11**   -  -0.08* 
      (3.4)    (2.3) 
 
)log( ,5445,
m
tiu
−   0.86**  0.86**  0.44**  0.44**   
   (21.8)  (22.6)  (12.4)  (13.4) 
 
Lagged dep. var. 0.19**  0.16**  0.56**  0.52**  
  
   (5.4)  (4.7)  (15.9)  (13.9) 
 
Fixed Effects  yes   yes   yes   yes 
 
Specific Trend  yes   yes  yes   yes 
 
Cross-section weights yes   yes  yes   yes 
 
 
# obs.   204  204  204  204 
 
R²   0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
 
DW   0.98  0.96  1.36  1.36 
t-stat in parentheses. ** = signif. at the 1% level., * = signif. at the 5% level. 
Table 6.2. 
Youth unemployment and country effects 
 
Dependent . variable  )log( ,3425,
m
tiu
−    )log( ,3425,
f
tiu
−   
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  
  
 
tiE , x FIN  0.37**     -  0.11     - 
   (4.0)    (1.0)   
tiE , x SWE  -0.31**    -  -0.02     - 
   (4.2)    (0.5)   
tiE , x NET  -0.75*     -  -0.30     - 
   (2.3)    (1.4)   
tiE , x GER  -0.60**    -  -0.44**    - 
   (4.5)    (4.0)   
tiE , x FRA  -0.14**    -  -0.09     - 
   (3.0)    (1.7)   
tiE , x SPA  0.12     -  -0.23     - 
   (1.4)    (1.7)   
tiE , x UK  -0.02     -  -0.46**    - 
   (0.50)    (6.6)   
tiE , x USA  -0.04*     -  0.04     - 
   (2.0)    (2.2)   
tiE , x Emp. Protection     -   -0.0057**    -  -0.0061** 
     (2.6)    (2.7)  
)log( ,5445,
m
tiu
−   0.91**  0.89**  0.54**  0.47**   
   (24.7)  (22.9)  (16.1)  (13.5) 
 
Lagged dep. var. 0.13**  0.18**  0.37**  0.51**  
  
   (3.9)  (5.5)  (9.7)  (14.3) 
 
Fixed Effects  yes   yes  yes   yes 
 
Specific Trend  yes   yes  yes   yes 
 
Cross-section weights yes   yes  yes   yes 
 
 
# obs.   204  204  204  204 
 
R²   0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
 
DW   1.20  1.00  1.43  1.33 
t-stat in parentheses. ** = signif. at the 1% level., * = signif. at the 5% level. 
 
Table 7.1 
Cohort Effects and Female Employment Rate in 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimate of the Female Employment Rate in the Year 2010
Female Employment Rate 
2001*
Female Employment Rate 
2010 (hypotesis 1)
Female Employment Rate 
2010 (hypotesis 2)
Mediterranean
Italy 41.11 49.33 50.21
Spain 43.75 49.63 50.59
Greece 41.14 48.34 49.37
Average 42 49.1 50.06
Nordic
Denmark 70.44 77.83 78.75
Sweden 73.48 76.22 77.17
Norway 73.75 76.5 77.46
Average 72.56 76.85 77.79
Continental
Austria 47.12 53.85 54.54
Belgium 51.45 60.68 61.61
France 42.20 50.9 51.63
Finland 65.40 72.05 72.96
Germany 58.76 69.17 70.05
Ireland 53.99 60.34 61.44
Netherlands 63.86 71.61 72.52
Portugal 61.13 69.21 70.20
Average 55.49 63.48 64.37
* Employment rates 15+ for France, Austria, 15-64 for the others.
Hypothesis 1: Age 15-44
Age 45-64
Hypothesis 2: Age 15-39
Age 40-44
Age 40-44 Employment Rate 2010 = Employment level 2001/Population 2010*100
Employment Rate 2010 = Employment rate 2001
Employment Rate 2010 = Employment level 2001/Population 2010*100
Employment Rate 2010 = Employment rate 2001 + 2%
Employment Rate 2010 = Employment rate 2001
